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The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in  
Patent Law 
abstract.  The ambiguity of claim language is generally considered to be the most 
important problem in patent law today. Linguistic ambiguity is believed to cause tremendous 
uncertainty about patent rights. Scholars and judges have accordingly devoted enormous 
attention to developing better linguistic tools to help courts understand patent claims. 
 In this Article, we explain why this diagnosis is fundamentally wrong. Claims are not often 
ambiguous, and linguistic ambiguity is not a major cause of the uncertainty in patent law today. 
We shall explain what really causes the uncertainty in patent rights, how the erroneous diagnosis 
of linguistic ambiguity has led the literature off track, and what will get us back on track to 
solving the uncertainty problem. 
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introduction 
The uncertainty over how courts will apply patent claims in adjudicating 
infringement is a real and very substantial problem in patent law today. A large 
literature addresses this problem.1 The common premise of this literature is 
that the uncertainty arises because claim language is itself uncertain,2 and the 
proposals for reform accordingly focus on linguistic solutions.3 For example, 
judges and scholars debate whether the best source of linguistic meaning is 
dictionary definitions,4 or the context provided by the whole patent document,5 
 
1.  See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8-11 (2008); Gretchen Ann Bender, 
Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim 
Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175 (2001); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 
(2009); Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured 
Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711 (2010); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005); Craig 
Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000); David L. 
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in 
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the 
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1105, 1163-70 (2004). 
2.  See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Claims 
cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face.”); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56 
(“We want to highlight . . . the issuance of vague claims.”); Dan L. Burk, Dynamic Claim 
Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 107, 112 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013) (“Due to the inherent ambiguity of language, the boundary remains 
necessarily indeterminate . . . .”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1745 (arguing that claim 
language may be “inherently indeterminate”); Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a 
Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP THEORY 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that “the limitations of language” 
cause uncertainty); Menell et al., supra note 1, at 716 (“If nothing else, the past two decades 
revealed the inherent difficulties of using language to define the boundaries of abstract and 
intangible rights.”); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 621, 637-38 (2010) (attributing the problem to “the inherent indeterminacy of 
language”). 
3.  See, e.g., AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he language 
of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation.”); Russell B. 
Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in 
Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1 (2002); Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, 
The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 829, 886-87 (2005); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 61, 63 (2006). 
4.  See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(favoring dictionaries). 
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or testimony from expert witnesses.6 A closely related debate is institutional: 
whether appellate judges, trial judges, or juries are best equipped to implement 
a particular linguistic solution and discern linguistic meaning.7 At the 
pessimistic extreme, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that claim language is 
so innately indeterminate that it should be abolished altogether.8 Although the 
proposed solutions vary widely, there is wide agreement that the source of the 
difficulty is that claim language is vague or ambiguous.9 We will call this the 
“linguistic indeterminacy thesis.” 
This Article challenges the widely shared premise. The uncertainty in how 
courts will apply claims does not characteristically arise because of uncertainty 
regarding linguistic meaning. There may be some occasional cases in which 
linguistic ambiguity (where language has more than one sense) produces 
underdeterminacy of legal outcomes, and more cases in which vagueness 
(where language has borderline cases) causes uncertainty; but we argue that 
uncertainty in claim application most typically arises because judges have core 
policy disagreements about the underlying goals of claim construction. In 
order to explicate and distinguish between these different sources of 
uncertainty, we will draw upon what has been called the “interpretation-
construction distinction” in recent constitutional theory.10 
Stated simply, modern constitutional theory draws a distinction between 
determining the linguistic meaning of a text (“interpretation”), and giving 
 
5.  See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(favoring the specification); Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to 
Escalating Reliance on Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 181, 189-90 (2003) (criticizing the Telegenix court’s “process of considering 
dictionaries before specifications”). 
6.  Nard, supra note 1, at 66, 69 (favoring expert testimony). 
7.  Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“The trial court is best situated to gauge the relevance and need for additional 
evidence to explicate claim terms.”), with Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 
1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[C]laim construction, as a form of document 
construction, is solely a question of law subject to de novo review.” (citations omitted)). 
8.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1784-86. 
9.  See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. But see Thomas W. Krause & Heather F. 
Auyang, What Close Cases and Reversals Reveal About Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit, 
12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583, 605 (2013) (arguing that disagreements arise 
because of policy differences among judges); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, 
and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2007) (arguing 
that disagreements arise because of “the particular cognitive processes by which legal 
observers reach legal interpretations”). 
10.  See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 
(2010). 
 the interpretation-construction distinction in patent law 
535 
 
legal effect to that text (“construction”).11 To take an example, there is some 
uncertainty in constitutional law about the contours of the state action doctrine 
as applied to the First Amendment.12 But the source of this uncertainty is not 
linguistic indeterminacy, and the answer to the doctrinal problem cannot be 
found in better evidence about linguistic practices in the late eighteenth 
century. The linguistic meaning of the First Amendment’s state action 
requirement—that “Congress” is bound—is clear. The cause of the uncertainty 
is not that people do not know what “Congress” means as a matter of 
semantics, but that strictly limiting the First Amendment to congressional 
action—and allowing other government actors to establish religions and censor 
speech—would result in outcomes that seem unwise or unjust. Courts react to 
this problem by engaging in constitutional construction: the courts craft 
constitutional doctrine with a broader scope of application for the First 
Amendment. Uncertainty about this doctrine results when judges disagree on 
how much broader the scope should be in light of the underlying reasons of 
policy and principle. This normative dispute over legal effect is very different 
from a dispute about the semantic meaning of the word “Congress.” 
The interpretation-construction distinction does not tell us how to resolve 
these disputes over legal effect. Rather, the payoff of drawing the distinction is 
antecedent: it tells us which issues are problems of linguistic meaning, and 
which issues are problems of legal effect. This is important because the two 
types of problems call for different solutions. More and better linguistic 
information (such as more accurate definitions or data about usage) can solve 
problems of linguistic uncertainty and hence result in more accurate 
interpretations. Linguistics cannot resolve policy debates and thus cannot 
resolve issues of construction. The limits of linguistics are especially apparent 
when the linguistic meaning of a claim underdetermines the claim’s legal 
 
11.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 118-30 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: 
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5-9 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) (discussing the 
interpretation-construction distinction in constitutional law). Although the interpretation-
construction distinction has recently become prominent in constitutional theory, it has been 
used in a variety of legal contexts. See E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of 
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 939-40 (1967). 
12.  Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (holding that the First Amendment 
applies to a privately owned company town), with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 
(1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not apply to a privately owned shopping 
mall). See generally Frederick F. Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in 
First Amendment Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1977) (discussing the lines of 
disagreement in this area). 
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effect. We shall call the space where linguistic information underdetermines 
legal effect the “construction zone.” 
The confusion between interpretation and construction—and the use of the 
wrong tools because of a misdiagnosis of the problem—is endemic in patent 
law. As mentioned above, the premise of the literature has been that the 
problems of claim construction stem from linguistic uncertainty. The same is 
true of the case law. The leading modern case on analyzing patent claims (we 
will use “analysis” to denote an activity that encompasses both interpretation 
and construction) is Phillips v. AWH Corp.,13 which deals with whether a patent 
claim to “steel baffles” covered non-bullet-deflecting steel baffles. Reflecting 
the consensus that the problem with claims is their linguistic indeterminacy, 
the opinion features an extended discussion of the role of dictionaries and 
other sources in determining linguistic meaning.14 But this was a fool’s errand. 
Nobody in Phillips—none of the litigants, and none of the judges in the 
majority or the two dissents—disputed the linguistic meaning of “steel baffle” 
or that this linguistic meaning covered a non-bullet-deflecting baffle.15 The 
dispute in Phillips was over the wisdom of giving legal effect to this linguistic 
meaning, because the patentee’s stated purpose for the invention was a bullet-
resistant reinforced wall, while the accused product did not deflect bullets.16 
Giving legal effect to the semantic meaning would thus arguably extend the 
monopoly scope of the patent to something that the patentee had not really 
invented. What Phillips really represents is a conflict about the underlying goal 
of claim construction: is it to give effect to the linguistic meaning of text, or is 
it to tailor patent scope to the real invention? As we will explain, these two 
goals are fundamentally different, and the inquiry becomes incoherent—and 
uncertain—when judges oscillate between them. 
In this Article, we are not taking a position on the question whether 
allowing patentees a broader monopoly than what they had invented or 
foreseen is good patent policy; that is a question for another day. Our point is 
that the interpretation-construction distinction provides a conceptual tool that 
allows scholars, lawyers, and judges to identify this policy disagreement as the 
true cause of disputes. Because most disputes over claim “meaning” are actually 
normative disputes over policy issues, a solution to the claim construction 
 
13.  415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
14.  Id. at 1312-19 (considering the claim structure, the specification, the prosecution history, 
dictionaries, and expert testimony). 
15.  Cf. id. at 1310 (noting the parties’ stipulation to the ordinary meaning of “baffle”). 
16.  See id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The abstract refers to 
‘bullet deflecting . . . baffles.’ Only angled baffles can deflect. It then mentions ‘internal 
baffles at angles for deflecting bullets.’ That could not be clearer.” (alteration in original)). 
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debate cannot be found in better linguistic sources. Efforts at reform should 
focus instead on resolving the policy disagreement among judges. 
Here is a road map. Part I provides background on patent claims and 
describes the conventional debate about problems in claim analysis, which 
attributes uncertainty to textual defects. Part II then begins by laying out a 
general theory for analyzing legal texts, in particular distinguishing between 
the interpretation of linguistic meaning and the construction of legal effect. We 
then lay out the kinds of problems that are generally addressed through 
interpretation, and the kinds of problems that generally fall under the rubric of 
construction. We will also distinguish between two kinds of construction. At a 
high level, courts engage in construction by determining whether to follow the 
linguistic meaning of text or to follow something else in making their 
decisions. At a lower level, if a court chooses to follow the linguistic meaning of 
text, it must decide how to fill in the gaps when the linguistic meaning does 
not fully answer a legal dispute (i.e., the dispute falls within the construction 
zone). As we will explain, both types of construction involve normative policy 
choices, and both are qualitatively different from the type of linguistic inquiry 
that occurs during interpretation. 
Parts III to V then apply this framework to patent law. We illustrate 
through exemplar cases our argument that claim analysis debates are mainly 
about construction: judges do not disagree about the linguistic meaning, but 
they do disagree about whether to construe claims according to the linguistic 
meaning or according to the patentee’s actual inventive idea. The two 
standards are different, and they represent different theories of construction. 
The policy dispute between them is the true cause of the uncertainty in patent 
law today. 
Part VI considers the implications of our analysis. Contrary to what 
scholars and courts have assumed (or professed to assume), it is simply not 
true that claim analysis disputes arise primarily because claim text is 
linguistically ambiguous. Better linguistic tools—which patent scholars and 
judges have felled many trees proposing and debating—will therefore not help 
resolve the uncertainty in claim analysis. Rather, the primary cause of 
uncertainty in patent rights is that judges disagree over the better theory of 
construction, namely, whether courts should award patent scope according to 
the linguistic meaning of the claim text or according to the real invention. We 
then explain how the interpretation-construction distinction provides a 
conceptual framework to evaluate proposed solutions to the problem, one in 
which policy proposals can be brought forward and evaluated as policy 
proposals. We argue that this is greatly superior to the conceptual strictures of 
the existing debate, where all proposals for reform (even those that are really 
policy prescriptions) are framed and evaluated as solutions to linguistic 
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uncertainty. By providing a conceptual tool that exposes the misguided 
premises of the existing debate and making clear the true causes of uncertainty 
in patent law, as well as by providing a better conceptual framework to evaluate 
proposals for reform, the interpretation-construction distinction lays the 
foundation for a more productive discourse about claim analysis. 
i .   the linguistic indeterminacy theory of patent law 
In this Part, we describe the conventional terms of debate over claim 
meaning, where the problem is presented as one involving linguistic 
interpretation. Before describing the debate over patent claims, however, it is 
useful to provide a brief background on what “claims” are, and how they relate 
to the rest of the patent document. 
A.  Background on Patents 
A United States Patent is a complex document, but its two most important 
components are the written description of the invention (commonly called the 
“specification”) and the claims.17 Both the specification and the claims are 
drafted by the patentee, and they both purport to describe the invention being 
patented. Though this might seem redundant at first blush, the specification 
and the claims in fact perform very different functions, and look quite different 
in practice.18 
The specification provides a detailed technical disclosure of the invention, 
so that others can make and use it.19 This requires considerable detail, so that 
the invention can be built from the ground up. For example, in the 
specification of their patent on the airplane, the Wright brothers described 
their pioneering glider down to the springs, ropes, cloth, and wood that it 
 
17.  Strictly speaking, the specification includes both the written description and the claims. In 
common parlance, however, “specification” is used to refer only to the written description 
component of a patent. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 40 (2d ed. 2011). We will 
follow the common usage in this Article. 
18.  Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“‘[T]he two standards, 
while complementary, approach a similar problem from different directions.’” (quoting 
Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))). 
19.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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used.20 These details are needed so that someone reading the patent could later 
(after the patent expires) build an airplane based on their example.21 
But, obviously, it is not particularly important that an airplane use a 
particular type of spring. The essence of an airplane is simply that it has wings 
and flies. It would eviscerate patent incentives if another person could take the 
Wright brothers’ airplane, change a few springs, and thereby escape 
infringement liability. In other words, it is important for patent law to 
encourage the Wright brothers to disclose lots of technical detail to allow later 
replication of the invention, but it would be unwise to confine the legal scope 
of the monopoly right by requiring those details to be slavishly replicated for 
infringement.22 
To solve this problem, patent law developed “claims,” which are one-
sentence descriptions of the invention that demarcate the monopoly right. By 
separating claims from the specification, patent law allows different functions 
to be fulfilled. In the specification, the Wright brothers can describe their 
airplane in tremendous detail. But in defining their patent’s legal scope, they 
are permitted to claim the essential inventive features.23 A simplified claim to 
the airplane might thus read: 
My invention is a flying machine that has 
(1) wings; and, 
(2) a rudder.24 
It is important to understand that the claim allows the patentee to cover 
much more than replication of the embodiment that is described in the 
specification. The Wright brothers’ specification described a single wooden 
glider: it barely flew, it had no engine, and it used cloth wings. But the 
inventive idea being claimed in our example above—an airplane with wings 
 
20.  See U.S. Patent No. 821,393 col. 2 ll. 103-06 (filed Mar. 23, 1903) (wood frame); id. col. 1 ll. 
108-11 (cloth-covered wings); id. col. 3 ll. 57-60 (rope pulleys); id. col. 8 ll. 111-19 (springs). 
21.  See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting the 
argument that “the specification need only disclose those aspects of the claimed invention 
that do not exist in the prior art”). 
22.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (stating that a 
rule requiring slavish replication would “convert the protection of the patent grant into a 
hollow and useless thing”). 
23.  See ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 10:1.1 (6th ed. 
2008) (“The claims should cover the inventor’s concept.”). 
24.  This is a highly simplified version of the key claim (claim 7) from the Wright brothers’ 
patent. See ’393 Patent cols. 11-12 ll. 62-74. The Wright brothers’ claim also included a 
requirement that the rudder be directed in the same direction as the roll of the airplane. Id. 
cols. 11-12 ll. 69-74. 
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and a rudder—covers all airplanes, including a future jet. It is bedrock patent 
law that anything that is described by a claim infringes the patent, even if it 
otherwise looks very different from the specification embodiment.25 Although a 
modern 747 looks very different from the Wright brothers’ glider (the 
specification embodiment), it still has wings and a rudder, and thus it would 
infringe a patent with a claim written in the manner of our example. 
In sum, the claim and the specification both describe the invention, but 
they serve different roles. For legal purposes, it is the claim that defines patent 
scope.26 
B.  The Problem of Claim Meaning 
As the Section above explains, claim scope equals patent scope,27 which 
makes claims very important. It is equally axiomatic that claim scope is defined 
by the text of the claim.28 It is generally regarded as very important that patent 
scope be entirely independent of the policy judgment of individual judges.29 It 
is the worst form of judicial activism, according to the Federal Circuit, for a 
judge to first decide whether an accused product ought be found to infringe 
and then twist claim text to reach that desired result.30 In short, claim analysis 
is supposed to be a process where judges first neutrally interpret the text and 
then allow the infringement chips to fall where they may. 
Yet despite these routine pronouncements by courts that they are rigidly 
adhering to claim text, it still seems that claim scope is wildly unpredictable. If 
one looks to the Federal Circuit, that court can apparently read the same text to 
 
25.  ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 27 (5th ed. 2011). 
26.  See Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1942) (“[I]t is these 
claims, not the specifications, that afford the measure of the grant to the patentee.”). 
27.  There is a narrow exception to this rule, known as the “doctrine of equivalents,” that allows 
a court to deem an unclaimed product to be infringing if the difference is “insubstantial.” 
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); John R. 
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 955, 958 (2007). 
28.  AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
29.  Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“No matter how 
great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework claims. They only 
interpret them.”); see also Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 
1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the 
normally terse claim language.”). 
30.  SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (stating 
that such a procedure makes patent protection “a matter of judicial whim”). 
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reach almost any outcome. The court has held that the word “a” means “one or 
more,”31 and it has also held that it means “only one.”32 It has held the word 
“plurality” to mean “more than one,”33 and it has also held the word to mean 
“one.”34 It has held that using the word “normal” limits a claim to technology 
in common use at the time of patent filing,35 while using the word “regular” 
does not.36 The list of inconsistencies and contradictions goes on. 
What observers take from these cases is that, because the judges purport to 
be applying the text but are coming to wildly disparate results, the text must be 
defective and its meaning is nearly always unclear.37 In short, courts and 
commentators subscribe to the linguistic indeterminacy thesis that the 
indeterminacy of claim language is what causes the disparate results and the ex 
ante uncertainty regarding patent rights. Proceeding from this predicate 
diagnosis, they then debate the merits of a wide variety of linguistic tools as 
solutions to legal uncertainty.38 For example, one line of case law argues that 
ambiguous claim text should be clarified by looking to unbiased third-party 
sources such as dictionaries and encyclopedias.39 Another line of case law 
argues that ambiguous text should be clarified by looking to the patentee’s own 
usage in the patent specification.40 Craig Allen Nard argues that ambiguous 
text should be clarified by looking to expert testimony about how a person in 
 
31.  Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
32.  Harari v. Lee, 656 F.3d 1331, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
33.  August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
34.  Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
35.  PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
36.  SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 878-79 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
37.  See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Claims 
cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum 
Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 51 (2005) (arguing that it is “folly” to assume 
“that the text of a patent claim, or any other text, has some readily discernible ‘plain’ or 
‘ordinary’ meaning”). 
38.  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(ordering rehearing en banc and directing the parties to discuss, among other things, 
whether “the public notice function of patent claims [is] better served by referencing 
primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a 
claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification”). 
39.  See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
40.  See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“The best source for understanding a technical term is the specification from which it arose 
. . . .”). 
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the field would understand the claim terms.41 Dan Burk and Peter Lee have 
each argued for a process of “dynamic” interpretation where courts would 
exploit the ambiguity of language to reach socially beneficial outcomes while 
purporting to maintain fidelity to text.42 Oskar Liivak argues that claims must 
be interpreted according to the invention, which he defines as “the set of 
embodiments conceived and disclosed by the inventor in enough detail that 
they can be reduced to practice.”43 Most extremely, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley 
argue that claim text is so innately defective that it cannot be redeemed and 
that the claiming requirement should therefore be abolished.44 Under this 
proposal, patent scope would instead be directly determined by courts 
according to what they perceive to be the patentee’s invention.45 
A closely related literature focuses on the institutional allocation of 
responsibility. If the problem is that claim language is unclear, then who is best 
equipped to implement a chosen linguistic cure? The Supreme Court in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. held claim analysis to be a pure question 
of law,46 implicitly allocating the task to appellate judges on the rationale that 
they are especially skilled in analyzing written documents.47 Patent scholars 
and judges have spilled much ink advocating a wide variety of alternatives, 
ranging from allocating claim analysis to district judges,48 to allocating it to 
 
41.  Nard, supra note 1. 
42.  Burk, supra note 2, at 118-19 (arguing that a decision-maker should “actively and openly 
contemplate[] and assess[] the potential outcomes from different readings of the text” while 
asserting that “[t]he text remains central to this approach”); Lee, supra note 2, at 105. 
43.  Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 5 
(2012). 
44.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1784-85. 
45.  Id. Unlike Liivak, who conceptualizes the invention as a set of tangible embodiments, Burk 
and Lemley conceptualize the invention in functional terms as the optimal scope of the 
patent. See id. at 1762; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation 
Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 127-29 (2005) 
(arguing for courts to manipulate claim analysis methodology to achieve a socially beneficial 
degree of patent scope). 
46.  517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (holding that claim analysis is to be treated as “purely legal” and 
“under the authority of the single appeals court”). 
47.  Id. at 388-89. 
48.  See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Michel, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing for deference to trial 
courts); Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1165, 1186-88 (2008); see also J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal 
Deference: An Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150360 (manuscript at 69) 
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specialized trial courts,49 to allocating it to the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO),50 to allocating it to juries.51 Invariably, the argument is that the 
alternative decision-maker would be in some way better able to understand 
claim language compared to appellate judges. 
Although the proposed solutions (and the proposed actors to implement 
the solutions) differ widely, they all share one underlying premise: that the 
root cause of the problem is linguistic uncertainty. That is, the conflict over the 
proper approach to claim analysis is believed to arise only because the text itself 
is linguistically ambiguous or vague in the first place.52 We challenge this 
premise. As we shall discuss, the cause of uncertainty in claim analysis is 
typically not a linguistic defect, but rather normative disagreement. In order to 
distinguish these two types of uncertainty more carefully, we will draw upon 
the “interpretation-construction distinction,” a concept in legal theory that has 
been widely discussed outside of the patent law literature. 
i i .  the interpretation-construction distinction 
In this Part, we first provide an introduction to the interpretation-
construction distinction. Our primary example will be drawn from 
constitutional law, where the interpretation-construction distinction has had 
the greatest contemporary influence. Much like the current argument in patent 
law, a once-common argument in constitutional law claimed that the 
constitutional text was frequently indeterminate. As Larry Simon put it, 
“[w]hile some of the provisions in the Constitution have relatively 
 
(arguing for “something approaching” de novo appellate review of documentary sources, 
but a more deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review for factual predicates). 
49.  Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
877 (2002). 
50.  John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative 
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 143-48 (2000) (arguing that courts should refer 
claim analysis questions to the PTO); see also Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 3, at 886-87 
(arguing that the PTO “is well suited to deploy its power over patent examination procedure 
to render dictionary selection far more predictable”). 
51.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(Mayer, C.J., concurring) (arguing that claim analysis should be considered a jury 
question), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
52.  See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1760 (“The process of claim construction itself 
presumes that the words of the claims are insufficiently precise to delineate those 
boundaries.”); see also AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim 
interpretation.”). 
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unambiguous, specific, and noncontroversial meanings, the language of a great 
many is so vague, ambiguous, and open-textured that they might be 
understood to mean almost anything.”53 For example, how cruel and unusual is 
so cruel and unusual that it violates the Eighth Amendment? This then led to 
the belief that textualism and originalism were unworkable, and that original 
meaning should have little role in constitutional analysis.54 
What the interpretation-construction distinction has exposed is a logical 
fallacy in the argument: the mere fact that the text does not fully dictate legal 
outcomes does not mean that it tells us nothing. Text can have a linguistic 
meaning even when legal outcomes are not fully determined: we know the 
linguistic meaning of “cruelty”—in the sense of it being a comprehensible 
concept—even when there are borderline cases of cruelty or the precise line 
between cruel and not is difficult to discern. 
As a result of this insight, there is now a wide consensus that original 
meaning has an important role to play in constitutional analysis, albeit not a 
fully determinative role.55 We believe that the interpretation-construction 
distinction can likewise inform the debate in patent law. We begin by 
explaining the concept itself. 
A.  A Simple Example 
Consider the first word of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution: “Congress.” In one sense, every reader of this Article should 
understand what this word means—it refers to the legislative organ of the 
federal government. But, in another sense, it is also entirely common as a 
figure of lawyerly speech to say that the First Amendment “means” that 
 
53.  Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 603 (1985). 
54.  See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Are We All Living Constitutionalists Now?, in ROBERT W. 
BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 165, 172-75 
(2011); Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in BENNETT & 
SOLUM, supra, at 78, 85-87; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 
60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 207-08 (1980); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—
Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 90 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 
1196 (1987). 
55.  Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 166 
(2008) (“By far the dominant position [today] is to regard original meaning as always 
relevant to constitutional interpretation, albeit only as a factor to be considered alongside 
other factors.”). 
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executive branch officials cannot prosecute political dissidents for their views,56 
and that district courts cannot issue injunctions against truthful speech.57 The 
First Amendment means these things because the Supreme Court has told us 
so. At the same time, however, executive branch officials and federal courts are 
obviously not the legislative organ of the federal government. Because the First 
Amendment’s semantic content is limited by the word “Congress,” its 
linguistic meaning does not extend to violations of free speech by any 
government institution other than the Congress of the United States. 
The contradiction between these two meanings of “Congress” causes 
lawyers to engage in all sorts of mental gymnastics. For example, we start to 
say that the word “Congress” is ambiguous, or that it has no meaning, or that 
the Framers must really have intended for the First Amendment to cover all 
branches of government.58 Jack Balkin has argued that “Congress” is a 
synecdoche—a literary device in which the part can refer to the whole—
primarily because a contrary interpretation would lead to a parade of horrible 
outcomes.59 Clear thinking on the subject becomes impossible, as we twist the 
word “Congress” into pretzels. 
 
56.  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (“[T]he law is settled that as a general matter 
the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to 
retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.” (citing Crawford-El 
v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998))). 
57.  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding an injunction against the 
publication of classified material to be impermissible). 
58.  See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1156 
(1986) (noting that many lawyers react to the problem by responding “that ‘Congress’ was 
an unaccountable slip of the pen by the Founding Fathers, and that no meaning could be 
attached to it”); see also Daniel J. Hemel, Executive Action and the First Amendment’s First 
Word, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 602 (2013) (noting that people find an argument that the First 
Amendment is limited to congressional action to be “frightening” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
59.  JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 204-05 (2011). If Balkin’s argument is purely about 
linguistic meaning, it seems implausible. The use of synecdoche or similar literary devices in 
a legal text is an invitation to confusion and misunderstanding; for this reason, the drafters 
of the Constitution would likely have avoided it. Balkin adduces no direct evidence that 
“Congress” meant “all three branches of the national government,” and we know of no such 
evidence. There is no other clear instance of synecdoche in the constitutional text, and the 
other occurrences of the word “Congress” seem clearly to refer to the institution created by 
the Constitution, consisting of the House and the Senate. In this Article, we do not consider 
alternative theories that would extend First Amendment limits to actors other than 
Congress. Cf. Hemel, supra note 58, at 604 (arguing that executive action abridging free 
speech would violate the Due Process clause). Even if there were no textualist route to the 
application of the freedom of speech to executive or judicial action, the extension could 
occur through constitutional construction. Our point here is only that one cannot reach that 
result through interpretation of the word “Congress.” 
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At its core, the payoff of the interpretation-construction distinction is to 
allow lawyers to think clearly about this situation. Legal analysis of the word 
“Congress” is a two-step process. At the first step, which we call 
“interpretation,” a legal analyst recognizes that the word “Congress” 
linguistically refers to the legislative organ of the federal government—this is 
the word’s linguistic meaning. At the second step, which we call “construction,” 
the analyst recognizes that the legal scope of the First Amendment covers all 
government. By conceptually distinguishing between the linguistic meaning 
and the legal meaning, we no longer need to twist “Congress” into pretzels. 
Our point here is conceptual: We express no opinion about whether it is 
wise or legitimate for courts to construe “Congress” differently from its 
linguistic meaning. Our point is that the two types of “meaning” are different, 
and it is crucial to recognize this difference. Without the interpretation-
construction distinction, legal analysis has a tendency to become a shouting 
match: one side says “Congress” means the legislative organ of the federal 
government by citing a dictionary;60 the other side argues that “Congress” 
means all government by citing all the horrible results that would ensue from a 
contrary definition.61 Neither side realizes they are talking past the other with 
entirely different modes of argumentation. Scholarly and judicial debate 
becomes unproductive and goes in circles when such cross-talk occurs. 
In the Sections below, we explain each step of the two-step process. 
B.  Interpretation 
1.  What Is Interpretation? 
Interpretation, as we have defined it (other labels could be used), is the 
process of discerning the linguistic meaning of a text using linguistic tools.62 As 
a working definition, the linguistic meaning of a text is the set of ideas and 
concepts that are communicated by the language to a member of the intended 
 
60.  E.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 
1266 (2010) (stating that “[a]s a matter of grammar and logic, the President . . . cannot 
violate” the First Amendment). 
61.  E.g., BALKIN, supra note 59, at 204. Balkin does not rely solely on the consequences of 
limiting the First Amendment to Congress; he also argues that this result is consistent with 
the purpose of the text. David Strauss also addresses the question of whether the First 
Amendment is limited to Congress. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1996) (arguing that “no one suggests that the 
First Amendment applies only to Congress”). 
62.  For a more complete account of “interpretation,” see Solum, supra note 10, at 100-02. 
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audience. This definition captures what is going on in our prior example—a 
member of the general public (the audience for the Constitution) would most 
likely understand “Congress” to semantically refer to the federal legislative 
body, rendering this the correct interpretation. 
Although people tend to notice the activity of interpretation only when the 
language is difficult to understand in some way (e.g., if it is a foreign 
language), it is actually an activity that occurs literally all the time when 
reading or listening: the reader is interpreting the words of this Article right 
now. Most of the time, interpretation occurs so intuitively that it is not noticed, 
but this is because our background education makes it simple. A foreigner who 
has no education in English would not find this Article easy to understand, and 
he would require an interpreter or dictionary to discern the linguistic meaning. 
An important feature of the linguistic meaning is that it is factual. The ideas 
and concepts that the intended audience will comprehend from a certain text is 
simply a fact about the world: the linguistic meaning is beyond the control of, 
and thus not dependent upon, the normative preferences of a third-party 
interpreter such as a judge. The linguistic meaning of “Congress” in the First 
Amendment is that it refers to the legislative organ of the federal government. 
A particular judge might very well wish that the First Amendment applied to 
other government bodies on policy grounds—and that judge might construe the 
First Amendment to cover all government—but such normative considerations 
are not part of the linguistic meaning. 
The objectivity of interpretation is important because there is a classic 
counterargument, often associated with the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
movement,63 that legal texts have no objective meanings—legal texts mean 
whatever judges say they mean.64 Such indeterminacy arguments are common 
in the patent literature.65 We think this argument is obviously wrong.66 The 
 
63.  See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462, 462-70 (1987). 
64.  Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907), in ADDRESSES AND 
PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 133, 139 (1908) (“We are under a Constitution, but the 
Constitution is what the judges say it is . . . .”). 
65.  See, e.g., Burk, supra note 2, at 112-18 (“Originalist theories . . . promise a determined 
meaning that they cannot deliver.”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 31-32 (arguing that 
there may be “no such thing” as an ordinary meaning to claim text); Lee, supra note 2, at 114 
(arguing against a view that “presumes that language is determinate”); Liivak, supra note 43, 
at 40 (arguing that “[c]laim interpretation is now a meaningless exercise” because it relies 
on bare text). 
66.  See Solum, supra note 63; cf. ROBERT BENSON, THE INTERPRETATION GAME: HOW JUDGES 
AND LAWYERS MAKE THE LAW, at xv (2008) (“The modern understanding of language and 
culture shows us that meaning is not something that texts possess. It is something that 
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linguistic meanings of legal texts are not radically indeterminate, because 
linguistic communication works. Indeed, the claim that law is indeterminate 
could not be made coherently if linguistic communication were impossible 
(because the CLS authors must themselves make the claim using language).67 
At the same time, we should acknowledge that indeterminacy arguments have 
an important surface appeal: familiar legal terms such as “freedom of speech” 
are quite open-ended in their legal scope.68 Such open-endedness or vagueness, 
however, only proves that the linguistic meaning is incomplete in specifying 
legal outcomes, not that the linguistic meaning is non-existent. The essence of 
the interpretation-construction distinction is to place under the rubric of 
interpretation the issue of discerning the linguistic meaning, and then to 
address the remaining issues—including but not limited to filling the gap when 
the linguistic meaning underspecifies the legal outcome—under the rubric of 
construction. We make no claim that the linguistic meaning by itself can 
answer all the legal questions.69 
With this understanding, in this Section we will explore problem-types in 
which interpretation is required and how linguistic tools can overcome these 
problems. To begin, we should emphasize that the existence of an 
interpretative problem does not prove that the text is indeterminate. The 
existence of an interpretative problem, such as the text being written in a 
foreign language, simply calls for interpretation to resolve the problem. It is 
only if interpretation fails to yield an answer that uncertainty results. Our 
examples thus also help us illustrate how interpretation works in various 
settings to prevent uncertainty from developing. 
 
interpreters produce.”); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 45 (1987) 
(“While most CLS writers have undoubtedly emphasized the inherent ambiguity of 
language . . . the more coherent CLS position has moved away from the tendency . . . to 
focus on the limitlessness of interpretations of each verbal command.”). 
67.  See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989). 
68.  See David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (2012) (claiming 
that language is highly manipulable in many situations, outside of precise rules such as the 
requirement that presidents be thirty-five years old). 
69.  Another way of saying this is that a distinction can be drawn between total indeterminacy 
and partial underdeterminacy. The idea that language underdetermines applications to 
particular cases is a modest one: underdeterminacy occurs so long as there are borderline 
cases (or vagueness). The idea that language is utterly indeterminate, however, is much 
more radical. See Solum, supra note 63, at 473. 
 the interpretation-construction distinction in patent law 
549 
 
2.  The Problem of Apparent Ambiguity 
A problem familiar to lawyers is the problem of apparent ambiguity, where 
a text at first blush appears susceptible to more than one interpretation. We say 
“apparent” ambiguity because, properly interpreted, a particular text almost 
always has only one correct linguistic meaning, though that correct meaning 
may be difficult to discern. The process of interpretation is to resolve the 
apparent ambiguity and discern what the correct meaning is. 
As an initial matter, it is important here to distinguish ambiguity from 
vagueness. Although the two words are often used interchangeably in legal 
conversation, they have more precise meanings in the philosophy of language. 
A word or phrase is ambiguous if it has more than one sense. For example, the 
word “table” by itself is ambiguous. It can either refer to a physical apparatus 
that is often paired with chairs, or it can refer to a spreadsheet such as one in 
Microsoft Excel. In contrast, a word or phrase is vague if it has fuzzy 
boundaries. For example, the word “tall” is vague, because it has borderline 
cases. If someone asked you, “Is Mr. Smith tall?,” it would be difficult to 
answer the question even if you knew that Mr. Smith’s height was five feet and 
eleven inches because the concept of tallness is fuzzy and five feet and eleven 
inches is a borderline case. But the word “tall” is not ambiguous, because we 
know that the attribute in question is Mr. Smith’s height (and not, for 
example, his weight). To jump ahead, apparent ambiguity can (generally) be 
resolved with interpretation; usually, context tells us which of the two (or 
more) senses captures the linguistic meaning. Vagueness (or open texture) 
cannot be eliminated in this way and hence requires construction. 
Let us begin by showing how apparent ambiguities can both arise in texts 
and be resolved through interpretation. An example from patent law is Merrill 
v. Yeomans.70 The patentee in Merrill had invented a process for producing a 
new type of hydrocarbon oil. He then claimed “the above-described new 
manufacture of the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils.”71 The question in the 
case was whether this claim referred to the new process of making hydrocarbon 
oils (if “manufacture” meant “process of making”) or to the new hydrocarbon 
oil product (if “manufacture” meant “thing produced”). This distinction 
mattered because the defendants were using the hydrocarbon oil product but 
not the manufacturing process. And because the word “manufacture” in 
 
70.  94 U.S. 568 (1876). Merrill is foundational in establishing that the patent claim defines the 
invention. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 801. 
71.  Merrill, 94 U.S. at 570. 
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isolation can denote either a process or a product, the claim was linguistically 
ambiguous. 
Although the claim was linguistically ambiguous, it is crucial to understand 
that this ambiguity could be—and, in fact, was—resolved using interpretive 
tools. The relevant tool here is to look to context, including the remainder of 
the text. The full claim reads: 
I claim the above-described new manufacture of the deodorized heavy 
hydrocarbon oils, suitable for lubricating and other purposes, free from 
the characteristic odors of hydrocarbon oils, and having a slight smell 
like fatty oil, from hydrocarbon oils, by treating them substantially as is 
hereinbefore described.72 
Once read in context, it becomes quite clear that the word “manufacture” in 
the claim refers to a process and not a product. A sentence that read, “I claim 
the above described new manufacture of the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon 
oils . . . from [untreated] hydrocarbon oils, by treating them substantially as is 
hereinbefore described,” would make no grammatical sense if “manufacture” 
was being used to denote a product. By considering the surrounding context 
and applying some ordinary rules of grammar, we can arrive at the correct 
linguistic meaning. The Supreme Court in Merrill in fact used this reasoning to 
arrive at the same conclusion.73 
We take two points from this example. First, apparent ambiguities can 
often arise in patent claims and other legal texts. Second, however, such 
ambiguities can be resolved if we have the right contextual evidence available—
and if the ambiguity is resolved with sufficient ease, it will not cause 
uncertainty. This second point has a corollary: if the contextual evidence is not 
available, then we may not be able to resolve the apparent ambiguity. 
The fact that proper interpretation depends on the availability of evidence 
does not change its factual nature. The resolution of factual questions generally 
depends on the availability of evidence. For example, whether criminal 
defendant X shot victim Y is an objective factual question—there is clearly a 
right answer in theory—but whether a court will be able to discern the correct 
answer depends on the availability of evidence. Similarly, ambiguity can cause 
uncertainty if there is insufficient evidence, but the uncertainty and 
disagreement will disappear if we have enough evidence. Our point here is not 
that resolving ambiguities is always easy—the type and quantity of contextual 
evidence that is needed will vary depending on the circumstances, as will the 
 
72.  Id. (emphasis added). 
73.  Id. at 571. 
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feasibility and ease of collecting such evidence—but that the exercise is 
objective. Even difficult cases have a correct theoretical answer, which sufficient 
evidence will yield. 
We should add one qualification to this: there are special situations where 
there is no single correct answer to an interpretative question. For example, if 
someone with a severe mental disorder writes something that is pure gibberish, 
then there is no idea that is conveyed to the audience and no linguistic 
meaning. Alternatively, in literary works, authors sometimes seek to convey a 
double entendre or double meaning to the audience, in which case there are 
multiple correct meanings (since both ideas are intended and conveyed). A 
double meaning can also occur when a legislature seeks to appeal to two 
conflicting constituencies at the same time, and intentionally uses ambiguous 
language that each side will understand as favoring itself, while “kicking the 
can down the road” to courts or some other institution to settle the substantive 
dispute.74 In the patent context, intentional ambiguity can occur when patent 
applicants seek to convey a narrow meaning to the patent examiner while 
conveying a broader meaning to potential competitors.75 In situations where 
multiple linguistic meanings are intended and conveyed, the ambiguity is real 
and irreducible: a court must construct a legal outcome by using something 
other than the linguistic meaning as a guide. All that said, however, such 
situations are the exception rather than the rule; in most of life, people do not 
routinely speak in gibberish or in double entendre. 
3.  The Problem of Unfamiliar Language 
A different type of interpretative difficulty arises when the text is in an 
unfamiliar language. For example, modern readers of Romeo and Juliet are 
prone to think that Juliet is asking for Romeo’s location in her famous line: 
“wherefore art thou Romeo?”76 This is not because the word “wherefore” is 
ambiguous, but simply because we are not members of Shakespeare’s intended 
audience of sixteenth-century theater-goers—who would have understood 
“wherefore” as meaning “why.” Similarly, the linguistic meaning of a contract 
written in Spanish will be difficult for many American readers to understand. 
Before judges can debate the legal effect of text in those cases, they first need a 
 
74.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1739 (1995) 
(noting that factions can appear to agree while glossing over substantive disagreements). 
75.  See infra Subsection IV.D.2. 
76.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET 71 (Barbara A. Mowat & Paul Werstine eds., 
Simon & Schuster 2011), act 2, sc. 2, l. 36. 
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translation of the linguistic meaning of the text.77 In patent law, a similar 
problem arises when claims are written in scientific jargon.78 
The correct linguistic meaning of a text written (or spoken) in unfamiliar 
languages can generally be discerned if we have available evidence, usually in 
the form of dictionaries and expert interpreters. We learned the meaning of 
“wherefore” in high school by looking the term up in a dictionary or from our 
English teacher. It is important to understand here, though, that dictionaries 
and expert interpreters are merely proxies for a deeper inquiry; what we are 
ultimately looking for is the understanding of the intended audience.79 Our 
English teacher probably learned the meaning of “wherefore” by looking it up 
in a dictionary, and the dictionary is likely based on historical evidence of 
linguistic usage from sixteenth-century England. While dictionaries and 
translators provide indirect evidence of meaning, the best evidence is provided 
by the linguistic facts themselves—the patterns of usage that determine 
conventional semantic meanings. 
As with the resolution of ambiguity, if the deep evidence of linguistic usage 
is not available, then the correct linguistic meaning likewise may be 
unavailable. For example, we will have considerably more difficulty 
understanding the linguistic meaning of the Code of Hammurabi, because our 
evidence of Ancient Babylonian linguistic usage is much more limited. There is 
still an objectively correct linguistic meaning, but in the absence of historical 
evidence we will not be able to reliably discern it. Once again, whether 
interpretation can yield the right answer depends on the availability of 
evidence. We will discuss how this point applies specifically to scientific jargon 
in Subsection V.C.1. 
 
77.  See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 30.0(e) (requiring translations of opinions from proceedings in Puerto 
Rico courts). 
78.  See infra Subsection V.C.1 (discussing the scientific jargon theory of why claim language 
might be ambiguous). 
79.  See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). Grice formulated the idea 
of “speaker meaning” to refer to the meaning that the speaker intends to convey to the 
audience based on the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. See 
H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, 4 FOUND. LANGUAGE 
225 (1968), reprinted in GRICE, supra, at 117. 
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C.  Construction 
1.  What Is Construction? 
Construction is the activity of determining the legal meaning and effect of a 
text. This legal meaning may or may not have anything to do with the 
linguistic meaning: as we discussed above, courts in fact construe “Congress” 
in the First Amendment differently from its linguistic meaning. 
As an initial matter, it is important not to confuse the interpretation-
construction distinction with another concept that is familiar to patent lawyers, 
which is the distinction between the construction of claim text and its 
application to the facts of a specific accused product.80 It is hornbook patent 
law that a court should construe a claim before applying its construction to the 
accused product.81 Thus, if a patentee claims “a table,” the court will first 
engage in construction: it will decide, as a legal matter, what the patentee’s 
legal monopoly covers. For example, the court may decide that the monopoly 
covers only “plastic apparatuses with six legs” (construction). The court will 
then look at the accused product to see if it actually is a plastic apparatus with 
six legs (application). 
Our point in separating interpretation from construction is quite different: 
it is to point out that the mere fact that a court says a “table” must be made of 
plastic and have six legs for legal purposes (construction) does not prove that 
this is the linguistic meaning of the word “table” (interpretation). A reader can 
slice the concepts more finely, as the “interpretation-construction-application 
distinction.” For our purposes, it does not matter whether application is part of 
the process of construction or instead constitutes a distinct step. We do not 
focus on the application step because (in the patent law context) it almost 
invariably follows from the construction.82 After a court has determined the 
legal scope of a patent monopoly, it is almost always a straightforward matter 
of bringing the accused product into the courtroom to determine whether it 
infringes.83 
 
80.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 50 (using the labels of “interpretation” and 
“construction” to refer to the distinction between the construction of claim text and its 
application to the facts of a specific accused product). 
81.  See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
82.  Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 837 (arguing that the meaning of a legal text may not 
be separable from its application). 
83.  Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“‘[T]o decide 
what the claims [legally] mean is nearly always to decide the case.’” (quoting  Markman v. 
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An essential difference between interpretation and construction is that the 
former deals with a factual question, while the latter deals with legal 
consequences and is irreducibly normative. It is a category mistake to say that 
the linguistic meaning of “Congress” should be “all government” because of the 
terrible consequences that would otherwise result, or based on some other 
moral or political theory of good outcomes. The linguistic meaning is factual; 
there is no “should” in that question. But it is a perfectly reasonable—if also 
contestable—argument to say that the legal scope of the word “Congress” 
should be construed to cover all government because there are good arguments 
of policy and principle for that result. 
The fact that construction is thickly normative does not mean it is arbitrary. 
Rather, much of legal theory attempts to prescribe principles for construction 
to avoid arbitrariness. Utilitarian economists argue for constructions that 
maximize economic efficiency; deontologists argue for constructions that 
comport with a particular moral view; and textualists argue for constructions 
that adhere to the linguistic meaning of the text. All are theories of 
construction. 
It is helpful to distinguish two different levels of normativity in the 
construction of legal texts. A particular act of construction might involve what 
we can call “first-order normativity”—where considerations of policy and 
principle are brought directly to bear on the construction of a particular legal 
text, such as by asking what the best construction of “Congress” would be to 
serve the policy purposes of the First Amendment. We can distinguish this sort 
of normativity from the use of normative considerations to justify a general 
method or theory of construction. For example, we might justify textualism 
(plain meaning statutory interpretation or originalism) on normative grounds, 
but then adopt a principle of strict construction that minimizes the role of first-
order normativity. We can call this second role for normativity (at the level of 
theory or method), “second-order normativity.” 
What emerges from the distinction between the two levels of normativity is 
that there are two somewhat different kinds of construction. The first kind 
occurs when the text is vague and the dispute falls within the construction 
zone. In this situation, virtually no one contests that courts may legitimately 
use non-linguistic considerations to fill the gap—there is no other choice.84 The 
 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., 
concurring))). 
84.  Some authors do, however, contest whether such interpretative gaps ever occur. See John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of 
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009). In the 
constitutional context, some theorists argue that linguistic uncertainty requires judicial 
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second kind occurs when a court adopts an anti-textualist second-order theory 
of construction, which then has the effect of overriding even perfectly clear text 
in at least some cases.85 We explore these two distinct kinds of construction 
below. 
2.  Choosing a Second-Order Theory of Construction 
Much of the resistance to the interpretation-construction distinction, we 
suspect, is driven by a belief that it inherently favors textualism and disfavors 
anti-textualist theories of construction. We emphasize that this is not the case. 
The interpretation-construction distinction identifies whether the linguistic 
meaning is being followed in a judicial decision or legal argument, but it says 
nothing about whether the linguistic meaning should be followed. The 
distinction itself merely identifies this as a question to be asked. 
We admit, of course, that asking the question has a political effect: there is 
a strong intuition within our legal and political culture that text should be 
followed if it is clear.86 When a legal text produces an outcome that is perceived 
as unwise or unjust, it is much easier for a judge or advocate to avoid the 
outcome by characterizing the text as “unclear” (and then “interpreting” the 
text in a congenial manner) than by openly arguing that the text should be 
overridden.87 Exposing the true nature of the anti-textualist argument 
 
deference to the actions of the political branches. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 
92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2012); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe 
Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 881-82 (2009); see also Solum, supra 
note 11, at 511-16 (discussing the views of both Lawson and Paulsen). 
85.  The debate between originalists and living constitutionalists can be seen as a dispute about 
this kind of constitutional construction. Originalists affirm the view that the original 
meaning of the constitutional text should constrain decisions, limiting the judicial role to 
gap-filling. Some living constitutionalists believe that other factors can authorize an override 
of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. See Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and 
Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 166-
67 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN 
AN UNJUST WORLD (2011) and JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)). 
86.  See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2011) (“At some level . . . everyone is and always has been a 
textualist.”). 
87.  For example, an advocate is more likely to convince a court to apply the First Amendment to 
the President by arguing that the word “Congress” is unclear (and should be “interpreted” 
to cover the President) than by overtly arguing that the constitutional text should be 
overridden by a judicial decision. 
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therefore makes it less likely that courts will accept it.88 But this effect is a 
function of our legal and political culture; it is not intrinsic to the 
interpretation-construction distinction itself. All the interpretation-
construction distinction does is identify the real issue at stake while remaining 
neutral as to its resolution: it demands that textualists state a normative 
justification for following linguistic meaning just as much as it demands that 
anti-textualists state one for refusing to do so. 
The fact that the interpretation-construction distinction does not 
inherently favor any particular theory of construction, but merely exposes the 
question as one to be asked, can be seen more clearly by looking at contexts in 
which the normative justification for following text is less obvious than in 
constitutional law (where the obvious justification is democratic legitimacy). 
Consider the situation of a contract of adhesion: while the general normative 
justification for following contract text is that the text has been consented to by 
both parties, for boilerplate contracts—which consumers almost never read—
such consent is arguably lacking.89 Because the normative justification for 
enforcing the text of boilerplate contracts is weaker than for fully dickered 
contracts, there is enormous controversy over whether courts should enforce 
adhesion contracts according to their text.90 The contribution of the 
interpretation-construction distinction here is that it allows us to see the 
underlying mechanics of the debate: properly understood, the argument 
against enforcing boilerplate contracts is not that the text is linguistically 
unclear (indeed, they are usually drafted to be extremely clear), but that 
following the text is normatively unjustified. And, although some contract 
scholars are upfront about their real argument,91 the judicial rhetoric is often 
more clouded: formal doctrine usually states that contracts of adhesion must 
be enforced as written unless the text is ambiguous,92 which then leads many 
 
88.  See Solum, supra note 11, at 478 (“[L]egal advocates might have a practical reason for 
conflating meaning and effect and hence for resisting the interpretation-construction 
distinction. If you were arguing for a result that is inconsistent with the meaning 
(communicative content) of the text, it would be convenient if your theory of 
‘interpretation’ did not require you to confront that meaning directly.”). 
89.  See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 21-24, 31-32 (2013). 
90.  For a collection of essays presenting a variety of viewpoints, see generally BOILERPLATE: THE 
FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007). 
91.  See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 89, at 19-32; Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). 
92.  See, e.g., Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282-83 (N.Y. 1978). 
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judges and advocates to find “ambiguities” that are not really linguistic 
ambiguities at all.93 
In patent law, we think the normative case for overriding claim language—
or at least doing so in ways that are unfavorable to the patentee—is quite 
obvious once one thinks about it. Patent claims are drafted by the patentee,94 
which means that they are likely to be written in self-serving ways that 
aggrandize patentee rights at the expense of the public.95 There is no obvious 
normative reason why courts should defer to self-serving claim language. But 
virtually no one in the existing literature has explicitly made this normative 
argument for ignoring patentee-written claim language, at least not in these 
terms. Although there are isolated passages in the literature that point to the 
fact that patent claims are drafted by patentees, the problem is almost always 
still framed in terms of saying that patentees will draft claim language in an 
unclear manner.96 Critics of patentee-written claims generally do not argue that 
patentees will draft claim language in a clear but self-servingly broad manner, 
which is what we think is the real objection.97 
In sum, nothing about the interpretation-construction distinction requires 
that the linguistic meaning be followed simply because it is there. What the 
 
93.  This was carried to the extreme by Chief Justice Traynor in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. 
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45 (Cal. 1968), where he argued that all 
text is inherently ambiguous. For the parallel of this move in patent law, see infra Subsection 
V.C.3 (discussing Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). 
94.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
95.  Broad claim language is not inevitably favorable to the patentee, in that it also increases the 
likelihood of the claim being invalidated. See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: 
Some Comments, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967). But, because courts have a strong 
bias against invalidating claims, a patentee will almost always favor broader language. See 
Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (noting structural barriers to invalidating claims). 
96.  See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Plager, J., concurring) (observing that “claim drafters . . . want claims that serve as 
business weapons and litigation threats” but characterizing the resulting problem as one of 
“indefinite and ambiguous claims”); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56-57 (describing 
the problem as patentees having incentives to draft vague claims); Burk & Lemley, supra 
note 1, at 1762 (stating the concern that “patent drafters can deliberately introduce 
ambiguity”); Kristen Osenga, Cooperative Patent Prosecution: Viewing Patents Through a 
Pragmatics Lens, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 115, 166 (2011) (“More often than not, the inventor 
submits ambiguous or vague claims with hopes that later interpretation of the claims will 
provide broader coverage . . . .”). 
97.  See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57 (expressing the concern as vague claims 
leading to overbroad patents); Burk, supra note 2, at 112 (expressing the concern as that “the 
intrinsic imprecision of text[] inevitably leads to a reading that is even broader than the 
patent drafter might originally have expected”). 
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interpretation-construction distinction does is expose the need for a normative 
choice about whether the linguistic meaning should be followed, and it 
identifies when participants in a debate are really arguing over this question. 
The proper resolution of the question depends on the type of text at issue, as 
well as the individual circumstances and the normative commitments of the 
decision-maker. 
3.  Filling Gaps and Drawing Lines on Vagueness 
Even if we adopt a textualist perspective, it is essential to concede that most 
legal texts will still leave some gaps that require further construction to fill. A 
city ordinance that says “no loud music after 10 p.m.” communicates a coherent 
and understandable idea, but the idea is incomplete in terms of dictating legal 
outcomes—we do not know how loud is too loud for a violation.98 Courts must 
then engage in construction by drawing a line. 
Drawing lines in this way is irreducibly normative. The word “loud” by 
itself will not communicate whether sixty decibels is too loud or not. There are 
some easy cases—holding a rock concert in a residential backyard will clearly 
violate the ordinance—but there will also necessarily be hard cases where 
normative judgment plays a role.99 Again, such judgments are not necessarily 
arbitrary; courts can look to normative theories such as utilitarian economics or 
natural rights theory to supply a principle. Our point is that one cannot draw 
this line solely based on the linguistic meaning of the words: “no loud music 
after 10 p.m.” 
There is one exception to this point, which is that words that appear to be 
vague according to their general usage may have a more precise linguistic 
meaning if the author and the reader share a special understanding about 
semantic usage that is not apparent to an outside audience without context. For 
example, if you go to McDonald’s and ask for a “large” cup of Coke, the server 
will give you a very precise size, because here the word “large” has a special 
semantic meaning that you and the server both share and understand. 
Similarly, although the word “high” is vague when used in its general sense, if 
your doctor tells you that you have “high blood pressure,” he probably means 
 
98.  Cf. TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 57-58 (2000) (giving a similar example of 
vagueness). 
99.  See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-
08 (1958) (arguing that logical deduction alone cannot resolve cases on the penumbra of 
legal rules). But see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279-90 (1977) (arguing 
that there is a right answer to every legal question). 
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that you have a blood pressure above 140/90 mmHg.100 A patent claiming a 
method of treating “high blood pressure” thus would not be vague. In 
situations where words have precise contextualized definitions, they are not 
vague and do not require construction (at least, not beyond choosing to follow 
the linguistic meaning). At the same time, because the special understanding 
must occur between the author and the reader within a narrow context (the 
word “large” only has this special meaning inside a McDonald’s store, and only 
for ordering soft drinks, and “high” means more than 140/90 mmHg only 
when referring to human blood pressure), this phenomenon virtually never 
applies to words in laws of general application. A special understanding that 
applies to everyone and across multiple contexts is no longer a special 
understanding. 
We should also make clear that a certain category of cases do not involve 
vagueness, even though at first blush they might be thought to. A good 
example is Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc.,101 which concerned 
whether the word “animal” in a patent claim included humans. A reader might 
be tempted to think of this as an instance of fuzzy boundaries—the word 
“animal” may or may not include humans, and humans therefore seem like a 
borderline case. But this is really a case of ambiguity, not vagueness. There is 
no problem of blurred boundaries—nobody asks how animal-ish a human is—
but rather the problem is that there are two discrete senses to the word 
“animal.” In the first sense, the word “animal” refers to all members of the 
biological kingdom of Animalia, including humans. In the second sense, the 
word “animal” is specifically used to counter-distinguish humans. The fact that 
the latter category is a subset of the former does not make this a vagueness 
problem. The two competing senses of “animal” are still discrete: they are not a 
continuum and do not have intermediate cases. This makes it a problem of 
ambiguity and not of vagueness. It is therefore not necessary to resort to gap-
filling to determine the correct outcome. Rather, as the court held, the word 
“animal” in the patent included humans because the patentee expressly stated 
that the word “animal” was being used in its first sense of referring to all 
members of the kingdom of Animalia.102 
 
100.  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 198 (3d ed. 2008). 
101.  579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
102.  Id. at 1380. We should note that we are not unsympathetic to the dissent’s argument that, if 
the patentee were using the word “animal” to include humans, this would make much of the 
other language in the patent specification rather strange. For example, the patentee spoke of 
“raising an animal” by feeding it, which is not usually the type of language one would use in 
referring to humans. Id. at 1383-84 (Lourie, J., dissenting). At least, we think that the 
dissent’s argument here is properly characterized as a linguistic argument about 
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D.  Payoffs 
At this point, some readers may ask about payoffs. Some readers might 
suspect that the interpretation-construction distinction is either artificial or 
useless.103 That is, the crux of the distinction is that there is an identifiable 
concept of linguistic meaning. But we then concede that (1) the linguistic 
meaning does not necessarily need to be followed, and (2) it will not always 
answer all the questions even if it is followed. If the linguistic meaning does 
not necessarily matter, then who cares? 
To this we have several responses. First, courts purport to care. Just about 
every type of legal analysis—constitutional, statutory, contract, probate, 
patent—takes as a matter of formal doctrine that courts are merely 
“interpreting” the text according to some objective meaning and are not 
“rewriting” the text according to their own policy preferences.104 We think that 
the linguistic meaning accurately captures this idea of an objective textual 
meaning upon which courts purport to base their decisions. 
It is helpful at this point to add a clarification. We believe that the linguistic 
meaning is a real feature of human communication, and we are merely trying 
to capture that reality with our definition; it is not an artificial construct that 
we have simply made up. That is, when people read the word “Congress,” they 
have an intuitive understanding that it refers to the legislative organ of the 
federal government, and this intuition remains even after they read a Supreme 
Court case applying the First Amendment to state judicial injunctions. Ours is 
largely a descriptive theory of how legal analysis works underneath the hood 
(including sometimes being deeply buried in the subconscious), to more clearly 
articulate what explains our intuitive responses to the text. 
Second, it is essential to isolate the linguistic meaning, and distinguish it 
from the legal effect, because otherwise legal analysis has a tendency to fall into 
 
interpretation, and it is not an unreasonable argument at that. We simply agree with the 
majority insofar as we think the balance of linguistic clues favors the majority’s reading. 
103.  See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 837 (suggesting that “interpretation is 
ultimately an act of application”); Christian E. Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a 
Form of Legal Interpretation, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 40, 41 n.2 (2012) (“This 
article rejects the interpretation-construction distinction as artificial.”). 
104.  See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2001) 
(“Because federal courts interpret, rather than author, the federal criminal code, we are not 
at liberty to rewrite it.”); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 
1967) (“No matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not 
rework claims. They only interpret them.”); Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, 647 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 
(N.Y. 1995) (“The court’s role is limited to interpretation and enforcement of the terms 
agreed to by the parties; it does not include the rewriting of their contract . . . .”). 
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circular, confused, or misleading argumentation. That is, the standard doctrine 
in almost every area says that courts follow the “meaning” of text. If, for this 
purpose, the “meaning” referred to the legal effect, then we would have a 
circularity: the court follows the meaning of text, but the meaning is the legal 
outcome, which is entirely within the control of the court.105 Under this 
standard, a court could do anything and it would always be right, which would 
make clear thinking impossible. Legal argumentation that collapses the 
interpretation-construction distinction is confused or misleading when 
considerations that bear on construction (first- or second-order normative 
reasons) are used to make arguments about linguistic meaning.106 As our 
example regarding the First Amendment illustrates, this logically fallacious 
mode of argument—trying to twist the linguistic meaning of “Congress” into 
covering all government based on policy considerations—is common among 
lawyers. 
Third, distinguishing interpretation from construction is important 
because it allows us to diagnose the causes of legal problems and uncertainties. 
The conflation of legal and linguistic meaning results in a situation where 
commentators are prone to blame language for any and all uncertainty in legal 
effect: if courts apply a legal text in uncertain ways, then commentators say this 
is because the language is not clear enough. And it quickly follows from this 
diagnosis that they seek cures to make the language clearer. 
Once we draw a distinction between legal and linguistic meaning, it 
becomes clear that this is a category mistake: not all legal uncertainty can be 
attributed to linguistic faults. The search for a linguistic solution will therefore 
often end up being misguided. As we shall discuss later, the category mistake 
(and the wild goose chase for a linguistic solution to legal uncertainty) is 
endemic in patent law.107 
Fourth, the interpretation-construction distinction offers an indispensable 
middle ground in debates about textualism. Without the interpretation-
construction distinction, debates about textualism tend toward two 
dichotomous extremes: textualists argue that text alone can resolve every legal 
issue and policy considerations should never enter judicial decision-making;108 
 
105.  See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) (“‘[Y]our decision is what you say it is’ would be 
tautological nonsense as an argument to the Supreme Court.”). 
106.  See infra Subsection IV.C.2. 
107.  See infra Subsection IV.C.1. 
108.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 14-16 (2012) (arguing that legal analysis can and should “begin[] and end[] 
with what the text says and fairly implies”). 
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anti-textualists jump to the opposite extreme and argue that, because text alone 
cannot answer every legal question, it is therefore utterly worthless.109 What 
the interpretation-construction distinction shows is that both sides are 
overstating their case and creating a false dichotomy. Contrary to what the 
textualists claim, the linguistic meaning of text cannot resolve every question—
at some point meaning runs out. Contrary to the anti-textualists, this does not 
prove that text is utterly worthless—it can answer at least some questions. We 
hasten to repeat that we are not trying to advocate either textualism or anti-
textualism in this Article. Our point is that one cannot begin to resolve that 
debate without first having a clear understanding of both the capabilities and 
limitations of language, and that the interpretation-construction distinction 
helps clarify those capabilities and limitations. 
i i i .  applying the interpretation-construction distinction 
to patent law 
Now that we have outlined the interpretation-construction distinction in 
broad terms, we will apply this distinction to the specific context of patent 
claims. We start by sketching the basic contours of the interpretation and 
construction of patent claims. We then apply this framework to the canonical 
case of patent claim analysis, and show that the dispute arose primarily because 
of normative policy disagreement rather than linguistic ambiguity. In Section 
III.C, we then explain how the conventional framing obscures clear thinking 
and leads to a fruitless pursuit of incorrect solutions. 
A.  An Initial Outline 
1.  Interpreting the Linguistic Meaning of Claims 
The interpretation of patent claims is the task of determining their 
linguistic meaning. Following our definition above, the linguistic meaning of a 
claim is the understanding of the text by the intended audience at the time the 
 
109.  See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643-44 
(Cal. 1968) (arguing against “a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent 
meaning of words” (footnote omitted)); Burk, supra note 2, at 116-17 (arguing that judicial 
reversal rates in patent claims prove that text is indeterminate); Richard A. Posner, The 
Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.tnr.com 
/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism 
(arguing that textualism has “all the room needed to generate the outcome that favors 
Justice Scalia’s strongly felt views”). 
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patent is written. Although the true intended audience of a patent will perhaps 
vary with an individual patentee (e.g., some patentees might file a patent just 
to show off to their friends), it is a reasonable generalization to say that most 
patents are filed to disclose an invention to the relevant scientific field and to 
claim monopoly rights against competitors, and that these people (i.e., 
scientists and competitors working in the same field) are thus the intended 
audience of most patents.110 And because a patent is generally written just 
before it is filed, the filing date of a patent provides a reasonable approximation 
of the date by which the linguistic meaning is determined.111 It follows that the 
linguistic meaning of a claim will generally be the understanding of a person 
working in the same field as the patentee (often called a “person skilled in the 
art”) at the time of the filing of the patent. 
It is important to counter-distinguish linguistic meaning from four 
extraneous concepts. The first clarification is that the linguistic meaning does 
not depend on the patentee’s unexpressed intent.112 This is important because 
courts often refer to a patentee’s intent in attempting to discern the meaning of 
a claim,113 but such a standard is prone to circularity. The patentee’s intent, if 
characterized at a high level of abstraction, is obvious and known to all: it is to 
claim as broad a monopoly as a court will let him get away with.114 Referring to 
this standard will make claim interpretation a tautology: courts will interpret 
claims according to the patentee’s intent, but the patentee’s intent will be to 
 
110.  Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A 
patent . . . presumes a readership skilled in the field of the invention.”). A true cynic might 
argue that patent claims are not written for skilled artisans but for the judge who adjudicates 
an infringement dispute. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their 
“Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 321, 340 (2008); Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 72, 99 (2012) (arguing that the skilled artisan is a hypothetical construct). 
This is in some sense true, but one must not use the perspective of an adjudicating judge as 
the audience for a legal command, because it makes the analysis completely circular—the 
meaning of the command becomes whatever the judge decides. See supra text accompanying 
note 105. 
111.  Cf. Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(reasoning that a claim’s meaning is assessed as of the filing date). 
112.  Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(“No inquiry as to the subjective intent of the applicant or PTO is appropriate . . . .”), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
113.  See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853) (stating that claims are to be construed 
according to what the patentee “intended to do”). 
114.  MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 26 (“The overall goal when drafting claims is to make 
them as broad as the Patent Office will allow.”). 
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claim whatever the courts allow.115 Patentee intent in this broad sense is a 
useless point of reference.116 
The second clarification is that linguistic meaning refers to how a person 
skilled in the art would understand the language of the claim. It does not refer 
to that person’s understanding of the patentee’s invention—i.e., the idea that a 
patentee is entitled to monopolize.117 This is important because courts often 
state that they are interpreting claims in accordance with the patentee’s 
invention.118 But a standard based on the patentee’s invention is also ultimately 
circular and useless. What a patentee is entitled to monopolize is a legal 
judgment that is controlled by courts.119 Thus, referring to such a standard 
again makes claim interpretation a tautology: courts will interpret claims 
according to a patentee’s legal entitlement, but that legal entitlement will be 
whatever the court decides is allowable.120 
The third clarification is that, although linguistic meaning depends on the 
language of the claim, it is not simply a matter of always going by the literal 
dictionary definition. For example, a doctor who says “you are not going to 
die” to an emergency room patient is not understood to promise eternal life.121 
We are not members of the so-called “‘dictionary uber alles’ school of 
 
115.  See supra text accompanying note 105. 
116.  Patentee intent at a lower level of generality is useful, because the understanding of the 
reader will depend on what the patentee intends to communicate through the language. See 
GRICE, supra note 79, at 86-116. To avoid the frequent confusion that surrounds discussions 
of patentee “intent,” we analyze the linguistic meaning from the perspective of the reader 
rather than the author. But one can get to essentially the same results with a careful and 
narrow understanding of the patentee intent as what is communicated by language, rather 
than a meta-level conception of intent as the patentee’s desired outcome. 
117.  Cf. Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (“[I]t is not unusual for there to be a significant difference 
between what an inventor thinks his patented invention is and what the ultimate scope of 
the claims is . . . .”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 566 (2009) 
(“The legal scope of the patent right is not the same as a technical understanding of the 
patented invention.”). 
118.  See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (stating that claims are “to be read 
with a view to ascertaining the invention”); Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 
261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) (stating that courts look for “what the real merit of the alleged 
discovery or invention is”). 
119.  Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1122-24 (2011) (explaining that courts face an inherent judgment call when defining the 
“invention” for patent scope purposes). 
120.  See supra text accompanying note 105. 
121.  See Osenga, supra note 96, at 126 (giving this example). 
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thought,”122 and we are not advocating unthinking reliance on dictionaries. A 
dictionary definition is merely a particular learned author’s opinion about the 
common usage of a word in society.123 To the extent that a dictionary definition 
can be expected to reflect the usage of persons of skill in the art, it is a useful 
proxy for the underlying inquiry. But it is only a proxy, and we ascribe no 
magical properties to dictionaries. Dictionaries can be wrong about the 
common usage of a word,124 and the common usage in any case can fail to 
reflect the particular understandings of a scientific field or fail to capture the 
contextual nuances of a particular usage in a particular patent. The important 
inquiry for interpretation is always how people in the field would understand 
the claim language, qua language, in the context of the patent in which it 
appears. 
The fourth clarification is that the interpretation-construction distinction is 
entirely different from the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence.125 Much conventional case law and literature discusses whether 
linguistic meaning is best derived from “intrinsic” evidence such as the patent 
specification and prosecution history or “extrinsic” materials such as 
dictionaries or expert testimony.126 To us, that debate is a red herring. Both 
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence are relevant to interpreting linguistic meaning, 
and both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence are relevant to construing legal effect. 
Our point is that they are relevant in different ways to each inquiry.127 
2.  Constructing the Legal Effect of Claims 
The construction of claims is the task of determining the legal scope of the 
claim, and ultimately of the patent. At this step, a judge has two important 
decisions. First, he must decide what weight to give to the linguistic meaning 
of the text, if any. As a realist matter, judges do not have to follow the linguistic 
 
122.  MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 821 (coining the phrase); see also Nard, supra note 1, at 4-
5 (calling this “hypertextualism”). 
123.  More direct evidence of common usage, e.g., a compilation of data about actual usage in 
newspaper articles or specialized journals, would be the same as or even better than a 
dictionary definition. 
124.  See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (finding that, although a dictionary defined 
a tomato as a fruit, “in the common language of the people” it was a vegetable). 
125.  Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 780 
(2011) (associating “the understanding of technologists in the relevant field” with extrinsic 
evidence and “legalistic” conclusions with intrinsic evidence). 
126.  See infra Section IV.A. 
127.  See infra Subsection IV.C.3 (describing two different types of “context”). 
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meaning in determining claim scope, and as we shall see they regularly do not. 
To the extent that judges choose to construct claim scope by some other point 
of reference, the outcome (and the certainty/uncertainty of that outcome) will 
depend on that alternative point of reference. As we will discuss in more detail 
in Section IV.B, the most common alternative point of reference is to construct 
patent scope to cover the patentee’s inventive idea. 
Secondly, to the extent that a judge chooses the linguistic meaning as his 
lodestar, the linguistic meaning may run out. Vague terms such as “near,” 
“about,” or “approximately” are common in patent claims,128 and there will 
always be the question of how close is close enough. Disputes involving 
borderline cases are in the construction zone. In such cases, a judge will have to 
resort to some alternative point of reference to resolve the dispute. 
B.  An Illustration: Phillips v. AWH Corp. 
A good way to demonstrate the clarity that the interpretation-construction 
distinction brings to the debate is to apply it to Phillips v. AWH Corp.,129 the 
canonical case on claim analysis. 
In Phillips, the patentee held a patent over a type of reinforced wall, which 
had internal steel supports (known as “baffles”). As the patentee had originally 
conceived his invention, the reinforced wall was to be used in “jails, bank 
vaults, armories, [and] firing ranges,”130 and so he configured the internal steel 
supports to deflect bullets.131 Accordingly, in the patent specification, the 
patentee described the invention as a wall containing “bullet deflecting 
internally directed steel baffles.”132 The patent specification also repeatedly 
emphasized bullet resistance as an important advantage of the patentee’s wall 
over other walls.133 
In the claim, however, the patentee made no mention of configuring the 
steel supports to deflect bullets or requiring the wall to have any kind of bullet 
 
128.  See, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 
F.3d 1063, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 
476 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
129.  415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
130.  U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 col. 6 ll. 4-5 (filed Apr. 14, 1986). 
131.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310. 
132.  ’798 Patent, at [57]. 
133.  Id. at col. 3 ll. 26-32, 43-44; id. at col. 5 ll. 67-68; id. at col. 6 ll. 10-12, 14-17. 
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resistance. Instead, the patentee claimed walls made with “internal steel 
baffles” generally.134 
The dispute arose when the defendant, AWH Corp., manufactured walls 
that had internal steel supports, but which were configured in a way that did 
not deflect bullets. Thus, pursuant to one reading—if “baffles” referred to any 
type of steel support—the defendant would have infringed the patent. But 
under an alternative reading—if “baffles” referred only to steel supports that 
were configured to deflect bullets—there would have been no infringement. 
The Federal Circuit obviously regarded this dispute as one over linguistic 
ambiguity, because the court’s opinion features an extended discussion of 
proper methodology to discern linguistic meaning.135 Moreover, Judge Lourie 
dissented as to the outcome, even while largely agreeing with the majority’s 
methodology.136 
1.  Interpretation 
The Federal Circuit regarded the dispute as one over linguistic ambiguity, 
but is there any such ambiguity in fact? That is, is there any reasonable dispute 
over how a person of ordinary skill in the art (in this case, a builder) would 
have understood the claim term “baffle” in the Phillips patent? 
Initially, we can concede there is one type of ambiguity in the word. If one 
were reading the word entirely without context—if someone randomly came to 
you on the street and simply said, “baffle”—the word would have multiple 
potential semantic definitions. It can be a noun that refers to a type of support 
in walls, or it can be a verb that refers to confusing someone (e.g., “I’m baffled 
by what you are saying”). In this sense, the word “baffle” by itself would be 
linguistically ambiguous. 
But looking at the patent in Phillips quickly eliminates this potential 
ambiguity. It is quite clear that the word “baffle” in the patent is being used as 
a noun in the sense of wall supports and not as a verb in the sense of confusing 
people. Only a minimal amount of context is required to know this: the 
surrounding words “internal” and “steel” make it impossible to understand 
“baffle” to operate as a verb. 
 
134.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310-11. 
135.  Id. at 1314-24; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (ordering rehearing en banc and directing the parties to discuss, among other 
things, whether “the public notice function of patent claims [is] better served by referencing 
primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a 
claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification”). 
136.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328-29 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Not only is there little evidence of ambiguity, there is strong linguistic 
evidence of what the word “baffle” means in the context of the patent. The 
patent abstract describes the invention as containing “bullet deflecting . . . 
baffles.”137 As a semantic matter, this indicates that the word “baffle” is not a 
label that refers only to something that inherently deflects bullets. As a matter 
of normal English, we say “a Catholic priest” but we do not say “the Catholic 
Pope,” because priests are not inherently Catholic while Popes are. Thus, the 
fact that the patent uses the words “bullet deflecting . . . baffle” is strong 
evidence that the word “baffle” expresses a concept of something that does not 
inherently deflect bullets. 
At this point, we are likely to get pushback from readers familiar with 
patent law, in some variant of this argument: “Yes, the word baffle in the 
abstract means steel supports at any angle, but the purpose of this invention—
as indicated by the quote about ‘bullet deflecting . . . baffles’—is to deflect 
bullets, and the patentee made that clear in the specification. Therefore, a 
builder would understand that the baffle in this patent must be aligned to 
deflect bullets.”138 
To which our answer is: correct, but that does not go to the linguistic 
meaning. The linguistic meaning concerns the person of ordinary skill in the 
art’s understanding of the claim language, which is a factual question. It does 
not concern the purpose of the invention, which is a policy judgment and legal 
construct. This is not to say that the argument is irrelevant to claim analysis. 
Saying that the linguistic meaning of “baffles” is steel supports at any angle 
does not imply the further proposition that this must be the legal scope of the 
claim. Thus, the normative argument should be considered in the construction 
step. In the next Subsection, we will show how this works. 
2.  Construction 
The prior Subsection in many ways reflects something that appears in the 
Phillips opinion itself. Nobody in Phillips—none of the majority, the dissenters, 
the litigants, or the amici—disputed that the “ordinary meaning” of “internal 
steel baffle” in the construction industry referred to internal steel supports 
generally, rather than steel supports that were configured to deflect bullets.139 
 
137.  ’798 Patent, at [57]. 
138.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 
1393 (2007) (criticizing the Phillips majority because “the court interpreted a claim to 
encompass an embodiment . . . that would not achieve the purpose of the invention”). 
139.  See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (citing a stipulated dictionary definition); id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (making no textual argument and arguing only 
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What the accused infringer and the dissent argued, however, was that the 
purpose of the invention was to have baffles that deflected bullets: 
[A] patent specification is intended to describe one’s invention . . . . This 
specification makes clear that the “baffles” in this invention are angled. 
There is no reference to baffles that show them to be other than angled. 
The abstract refers to “bullet deflecting . . . baffles.” Only angled baffles 
can deflect. It then mentions “internal baffles at angles for deflecting 
bullets.” That could not be clearer.140 
As the quote demonstrates, the dissent is not making an argument about 
linguistic usage.141 The dissent’s basic argument is that the patentee’s invention 
(as shown by the specification) is a bullet-deflecting baffle. Its point is that 
“baffle” should mean something that deflects bullets, because otherwise the 
claim would cover more than the idea that the patentee had really invented.142 
But, as above, this is construction, not interpretation. An argument that 
“baffle” must mean something that deflects bullets because otherwise the claim 
covers an idea the patentee did not invent has the same form as an argument 
that “Congress” must mean all government because otherwise the First 
Amendment does not prohibit the President from imprisoning dissidents. Both 
are arguments that say that a word, taken by its linguistic meaning, will 
produce bad outcomes. Both arguments may have validity, but they are 
normative arguments—they are not about linguistic meaning. It is conceptually 
clearer, and avoids twisting words into pretzels, to acknowledge that “baffle” 
linguistically refers to a steel support at any angle, but suggest that, for policy 
reasons, the claim should be given a narrower legal scope, covering only steel 
supports that deflect bullets. 
This, we submit, is a much clearer and more precise version of what the 
dissent’s argument in Phillips really was. Adopting this view of the case allows 
 
that the “specification makes clear that the ‘baffles’ in this invention are angled” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that claim analysis should be done by 
district courts and not opining on the merits). 
140.  Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
141.  Several commentators have argued to us that the linguistic meaning of “baffle” is 
ambiguous because, accepting that “baffle” refers to any structure that impedes flow, there 
would still be no infringement in Phillips given that the accused structure was perpendicular 
to the wall. We agree that one could make this linguistic argument in favor of finding non-
infringement in Phillips. Our response is that the argument was not made by the dissent and 
thus was not the cause of judicial disagreement in the case. Nor does this argument illustrate 
any ambiguity in the word “baffle.” The argument is saying that the majority determinately 
erred in applying the linguistic meaning of “baffle,” not that the meaning is indeterminate. 
142.  See Lemley, supra note 138, at 1393. 
 the yale law journal  123:530   2013  
570 
 
us to see that the two sides were talking past each other with entirely different 
modes of argumentation. The majority cites a dictionary definition of “baffle” 
and the linguistic usage in the specification;143 the dissent cites the purpose of 
the invention.144 Implicitly, the majority adopts a theory of construction where 
the linguistic meaning will be followed, while the dissent adopts a theory of 
construction that disregards the linguistic meaning in favor of the purpose of 
the invention. We are not taking sides here on which is the better theory of 
construction. Our point is an antecedent one: it is impossible to see what is 
going on without first dissecting the difference between the majority’s focus on 
the linguistic meaning of text, given its theory of construction that text must be 
followed, and the dissent’s focus on the purpose of the invention as the 
reference point for its theory of construction. 
C.  Prior Articulations of the Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent 
Law 
At this point, it is useful to note that other authors have previously 
distinguished between “interpretation” and “construction” in ways that seem 
to track our analysis. We think that this history is helpful to our argument in 
proving that the conceptual difference between interpretation and construction 
is a real feature of claim analysis and thus has not gone entirely unnoticed by 
participants in the patent system. Nonetheless, as we will explain, we also 
think that prior articulations of the distinction have not fully captured its 
essence, and that the inadequacies of these prior articulations have 
unfortunately obscured the underlying importance of drawing the distinction 
for purposes of conceptual clarity. 
The PTO historically drew the interpretation-construction distinction in 
this form: its examiners—as people of skill in the art—“interpret” patent claims 
during examination, while courts “construe” claims in litigation to determine 
their legal effect.145 The consequence, according to the PTO, was that its 
examiners were not bound by the same rules that courts applied to construe 
 
143.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324-25. The majority later argues that its holding does not contradict the 
purpose of the invention because the patent never describes bullet resistance as the exclusive 
purpose of the invention. Id. at 1325-27. In this way the majority gives some attention to the 
purpose of the invention, but only as lip service. The key point is that the majority gives 
great weight to linguistic considerations and little weight to the purpose of the invention, 
while the dissent does the opposite. 
144.  Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
145.  MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 652 (3d ed. 2009). 
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patent claims.146 The PTO no longer abides by this position,147 and we think 
the position is defective. PTO examiners are still looking at the legal effect of 
claims to determine whether the patent is legally entitled to issue, and thus are 
doing construction. Nonetheless, the parallels at first glance between the 
PTO’s historical position and our articulation of the real conceptual difference 
between interpretation and construction are quite obvious. 
Another variant of the interpretation-construction distinction has been put 
forward by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, who use the label “interpretation” to 
denote a determination of the (legal) meaning of the claim while using the 
label “construction” to denote the application of the claim language to the 
concrete facts of an accused product.148 As we explained in Subsection II.C.1, 
we think this is a miscomprehension of what the interpretation-construction 
distinction is about, but in any event, we use the terms “interpretation” and 
“construction” to refer to different concepts than those proposed by Burk and 
Lemley. 
In our minds, the closest prior exposition of the interpretation-construction 
distinction in patent law appears in Judge Newman’s dissenting opinion in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.149 In that opinion, Judge Newman 
stated: 
In patent infringement litigation there is often a factual dispute as to 
the meaning and scope of the technical terms or words of art as they are 
used in the particular patented invention. When such dispute arises its 
resolution is not a ruling of law, but a finding of fact. Such findings of 
meaning, scope, and usage have been called the “interpretation” of 
disputed terms of a document, as contrasted with the “construction” or 
legal effect of a document.150 
At first glance, this quote from Judge Newman quite closely matches our 
conception of the interpretation-construction distinction. Yet it does not fully 
capture the essence of the distinction. In Judge Newman’s view, the proper 
 
146.  See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting the PTO’s position that “the 
rules of claim construction in infringement actions differ from the rules for claim 
interpretation during prosecution in the PTO”). 
147.  ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 652. The PTO does continue to abide by the position that 
it construes claims more broadly than courts do during infringement litigation. MPEP § 2111 
(8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012). But it no longer relies on a conceptual distinction between 
interpretation and construction to maintain its position. 
148.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 50. 
149.  52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
150.  Id. at 1000 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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interpretation of claims will depend a great deal on what the interpreter thinks 
the invention is. As Judge Newman explains later in her dissent, her version of 
interpretation looks to the patent specification because it “contains the 
description of the invention.”151 We think this is a serious mistake: as explained 
above, and as we will emphasize in the next Part, we think that an essential 
insight of the interpretation-construction distinction is to distinguish between 
the meaning of claim language, qua language, on one hand, and the patentee’s 
invention, on the other. In this respect, we think our articulation of the 
interpretation-construction distinction is closer to the real conceptual 
difference between the two activities, and that our version provides important 
insights into claim analysis that Judge Newman’s version obscures. 
iv.  why disputes are over construction 
A.  The Conventional Framing: Dictionary Versus Specification as Guides to 
Linguistic Meaning 
In the conventional framing, the Federal Circuit is divided into two 
camps.152 One camp, the “dictionary-first” camp, supposedly sees the 
dictionary as being the best guide to linguistic meaning: 
Dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises, publicly available at the time 
the patent is issued, are objective resources that serve as reliable sources 
of information on the established meanings that would have been 
attributed to the terms of the claims by those of skill in the art. Such 
references are unbiased reflections of common understanding . . . not 
colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation.153 
 
151.  Id. at 1002 (emphasis added). We should note here that we have no objection to looking to 
the specification as part of the interpretative process. But our reason to look at the 
specification—for linguistic context—is very different from Judge Newman’s. See infra 
Subsection IV.C.3. 
152.  See, e.g., Bender, supra note 1, at 215-16 (discussing conflicting methodologies); Hattenbach, 
supra note 5, at 189-90 (criticizing dictionaries and arguing for greater reliance on the 
specification); Karen C. Mitch, Pondering a “Baffling” Situation: The “Reconstruction” of 
Claim Construction, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 631 (2005) (describing 
“uncertainty” resulting from two conflicting methodologies); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent 
Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 356-57 (2007) 
(distinguishing between the “formalist” and “substantive” approaches); Osenga, supra note 
3, at 78 (observing “the split between the dictionary-dependent and the specification-
dependent factions”). 
153.  Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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The opposing camp, commonly called the “specification-first” camp, 
supposedly opposes the dictionary-first camp by arguing that the patent 
specification provides a better guide to linguistic meaning: 
The best source for understanding a technical term is the specification 
from which it arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history. 
The evolution of restrictions in the claims, in the course of examination 
in the PTO, reveals how those closest to the patenting process—the 
inventor and the patent examiner—viewed the subject matter.154 
What happens frequently in cases is that one camp of judges will cite the 
dictionary to support a broad construction of the claim, while another camp of 
judges will cite the specification for a narrow construction. In Phillips, for 
example, the majority opinion invokes a dictionary definition to say that 
“baffle” means a steel support capable of “obstruct[ing] the flow of something” 
generally,155 while the dissent cites the specification to say that “baffles” in the 
particular patent must be angled and capable of deflecting bullets.156 
Rhetorically, both sides appear to be pursuing the linguistic meaning, just 
using different tools. 
B.  The Real Dispute: Linguistic Meaning Versus the “True” Invention 
The core payoff of applying the interpretation-construction distinction in 
patent law is to show that the conventional framing is fundamentally 
misconceived. The conflict does not occur because the dictionary-first camp 
and the specification-first camp are both pursuing the linguistic meaning but 
coming to different results. Rather, the uncertainty in claim analysis arises 
because some judges adopt a textualist theory of construction that pursues the 
linguistic meaning of claim text while others adopt a theory of construction 
that pursues the true invention. It is this age-old conflict between textualism 
and anti-textualism—a quintessentially normative conflict—that causes claim 
uncertainty. Below, we elaborate on the mechanism by which this conflict 
arises. 
 
154.  Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
155.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
156.  Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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1.  Doctrine Treats the Patentee’s Invention as Equivalent to the Linguistic 
Meaning of Claim Text 
Initially, we think it utterly uncontroversial to say that judges routinely 
seek to construe claims to cover the patentee’s invention. Indeed it is 
considered axiomatic that they do so. Courts treat “the understanding of claim 
text by a person of skill in the art” and “the patentee’s invention” as if they 
were interchangeable and equivalent concepts. In United States v. Adams, the 
Supreme Court says “it is fundamental that claims are to be construed in the 
light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining 
the invention.”157 In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit holds that the 
question for claim construction is “how a person of ordinary skill in the art 
understands a claim term.”158 The courts perceive absolutely no difference 
between these two formulations. Indeed, often the same case recites both 
formulations in one breath.159 
2.  The Patentee’s Invention Is Not the Linguistic Meaning of Claim Text 
What these courts do not appreciate is that the patentee’s invention is not 
the linguistic meaning of claim text. The “invention” is the new, useful, and 
non-obvious idea that the patentee discloses in the patent specification. The 
linguistic meaning of claim text is how a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would understand the language of the claim text. The relevant relationship 
between the two is that section 112 of the patent statute says the patentee is 
supposed to write claim text that covers his actual invention.160 The fact that the 
patentee has a statutory duty to write claims that cover the invention, however, 
does not mean that patentees inherently comply. It is absurd to equate the 
existence of a duty with compliance at a conceptual level. If a tax evader claims 
an income of “zero” on his tax return when his actual income was one million 
dollars, no one would argue that courts should therefore read “zero” to really 
mean “one million.” 
 
157.  United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966). 
158.  415 F.3d at 1313; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 372 (1938) 
(framing the question as “whether the language . . . conveyed definite meaning to those 
skilled in the art”). 
159.  See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Adams, 383 U.S. at 49). 
160.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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3.  Examples of Conflation 
Examples will prove our proposition that courts incorrectly conflate the 
two concepts into a single doctrine, which then allows individual judges to 
invoke different theories of construction while purporting to apply a shared 
concept of “meaning.” Our prior discussion of Phillips already provided one 
example.161 In Phillips, beneath a veneer of agreement regarding claim 
construction doctrine,162 there is in fact no agreement at all: the majority is 
looking for the linguistic meaning of “baffle,” while the dissent is looking for 
the true invention. 
A second example—with the arguments the same but the results reversed—
is Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.163 The facts of the case 
involve a patent on a type of syringe with a “body.” In the patent specification, 
all the examples given were of one-piece syringes. The question was whether 
the claim term “body” covered a competitor’s two-piece syringe. 
The majority opinion began by looking at the ordinary meaning of “body,” 
and conceded that the ordinary meaning alone could cover syringes with 
multiple pieces. However, it then held: 
In this case, while the claims leave open the possibility that the recited 
“body” may encompass a syringe body composed of more than one 
piece, the specifications tell us otherwise. They expressly recite that “the 
invention” has a body constructed as a single structure, expressly 
distinguish the invention from the prior art based on this feature, and 
only disclose embodiments that are expressly limited to having a body 
that is a single piece. Thus, a construction of “body” that limits the term to 
a one-piece body is required to tether the claims to what the specifications 
indicate the inventor actually invented.164 
This quote clearly demonstrates that the Retractable Technologies majority is 
construing the scope of the claim based on its conception of what the patentee 
invented. This is in contrast to the approach of the Retractable Technologies 
 
161.  See supra Section III.B. 
162.  See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328-29 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I 
fully join the portion of the court’s opinion resolving the relative weights of specification 
and dictionaries in interpreting patent claims . . . . I could elaborate more expansively on 
that topic, but Judge Bryson’s opinion for the majority says it so well, there is little reason 
for me to repeat its truths.”). 
163.  653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
164.  Id. at 1305 (emphasis added). 
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dissent, which focuses its analysis on the linguistic meaning of “body.” The 
dissent begins by noting that “[t]he ordinary and customary meaning of ‘body’ 
does not inherently contain a one-piece structural limitation.”165 It then argues 
that the fact that the patentee used the words “one-piece body” in the 
specification actually creates a linguistic inference that “body” is not limited to a 
single piece object: if the patentee had thought that “body” was a label for an 
object that inherently had only a single piece, then the phrase “one-piece body” 
would be redundant.166 Once again, we have two camps that are speaking past 
each other because they are looking for different things. 
A final example that illustrates why this divide causes so much uncertainty 
is Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. Hemcon, Inc.,167 where the en banc 
Federal Circuit divided exactly 5-5. In Marine Polymer, the patentee invented a 
process for creating a type of polymer, known as poly-ß-14-N-
acetylglucosamine (p-GlcNAc), which is useful in medical applications.168 In 
particular, the patentee developed what he called “biocompatible” p-GlcNAc, 
which everyone agreed was a reference to the compound’s degree of biological 
reactivity (lower reactivity was better).169 The precise question at issue was 
whether the word “biocompatible” specifically denoted zero reactivity. 
In the first opinion, authored by Judge Lourie, one half of the court argued 
that “biocompatible” meant that a compound must have zero detectable 
reactivity.170 Judge Lourie based his decision exclusively on a passage from the 
specification that stated: “[I]t is demonstrated that the p-GlcNAc of the 
invention exhibits no detectable biological reactivity.”171 
In the second opinion, authored by Judge Dyk, the other half of the court 
argued that “biocompatible” meant only that a compound exhibits low 
reactivity and did not necessarily have to exhibit zero detectable reactivity.172 
Judge Dyk based his decision on the fact that the patentee had written two sets 
of claims173: In one set of claims, the patentee had claimed all “biocompatible” 
p-GlcNAc compounds generically;174 while in the other set of claims he had 
 
165.  Id. at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
166.  Id. 
167.  672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
168.  Id. at 1354 (opinion of Lourie, J.). 
169.  Id. at 1354-55. 
170.  Id. at 1359. 
171.  Id. at 1358 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
172.  Id. at 1368 (opinion of Dyk, J.). 
173.  Id. 
174.  See U.S. Patent No. 6,864,245 col. 71 ll. 57-65 (filed July 11, 2003). 
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specifically claimed a “biocompatible poly-ß-14-N-acetylglucosamine . . . 
which has an elution test score of 1” (the elution test is a test of reactivity, with a 
score of zero denoting no detectable reactivity).175 If the word “biocompatible” 
itself denoted a compound that had zero detectable reactivity, then a claim to 
“biocompatible p-GlcNAc having an elution test score of 1” (denoting low 
detectable reactivity) would be nonsensical. 
Once we conceptually distinguish between the linguistic meaning and the 
patentee’s invention, it becomes clear again that the court is really disagreeing 
over the proper theory of construction. Judge Lourie’s opinion is focusing on 
what the patentee invented. Judge Dyk’s opinion is focusing on what the 
linguistic rules of English tell us about the linguistic meaning of the word 
“biocompatible.” There is in fact no contradiction between saying that the 
word “biocompatible” means low (and not necessarily zero) detectable 
reactivity as a linguistic matter, and saying that the invention is p-GlcNAc of 
zero detectable reactivity. What we must realize is that the linguistic meaning 
of the claim language does not always reflect the patentee’s invention. The 
widespread perception that the two sides disagree over linguistic meaning 
occurs only because of the incorrect conflation of the linguistic meaning with 
the substantive invention. 
C.  The Consequences of Conflation 
1.  The Incorrect Diagnosis of Linguistic Indeterminacy 
The first pernicious consequence of the conceptual confusion in this area is 
that courts and commentators wrongly attribute legal uncertainty to linguistic 
defects. As we have shown, in many of the most prominent cases, the conflict 
and uncertainty about legal outcomes is not attributable to any kind of 
linguistic uncertainty—the linguistic meaning of the disputed terms in Phillips, 
Retractable Technologies, and Marine Polymer is quite clear, and the anti-
textualist side in these cases did not make any linguistic arguments to dispute 
the meaning of the claim. Rather, the counterargument in all these cases is that 
the linguistic meaning departs from the patentee’s actual invention. That may 
be a good argument, but it is not a linguistic argument. 
 
175.  Id. at col. 72 ll. 1-2 (emphasis added). 
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2.  Obscuring Judicial Policy-Making 
A second pernicious consequence of the conflation is that judges obscure 
their policy-making role under the guise of debating an objective linguistic 
question.176 That is, a judge who argues for construing a claim according to the 
true invention is really making a policy argument about the optimal degree of 
patent scope. But, under the rhetoric of the linguistic indeterminacy thesis, the 
issue is framed as a pure linguistic debate that is independent of judicial policy 
views. The conflation thus has the harmful consequence of rendering judicial 
decisions less transparent and shielding judges from the need to explain and 
justify their policy decisions. 
In order to fully appreciate why judges are invariably making policy 
judgments in claim construction, it is first important to understand that “the 
true invention” is not an objective fact that has independent existence outside 
the control of courts.177 Rather, it is a legal construct: a court looking for “the 
true invention” will invariably find that the invention is whatever the judge 
thinks it is. 
This requires some explanation. The patentee’s invention can generally be 
understood as the new, useful, and non-obvious idea that is disclosed in the 
patent.178 Whether an idea is “useful” entirely depends on what kinds of things 
the judge thinks are useful to society (using some theory of social utility), 
which is a matter of subjective judgment rather than objective fact. More 
counterintuitively, “the” idea that is disclosed in the patent is also a matter of 
judgment rather than fact because every patent contains an almost-infinite 
array of new and useful ideas at different levels of abstraction. Choosing one 
idea to call the inventive idea is therefore a legal construct. 
 
176.  Farnsworth made a similar point regarding the conflation of interpretation and construction 
in contract law. Specifically, he wrote that courts have “often ignored [the interpretation-
construction distinction] by characterizing the process of construction as that of 
‘interpretation’ in order to obscure the extent of their control over private agreement.” E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 478 (1982). 
177.  Chiang, supra note 119, at 1122-23. Oskar Liivak argues that “the invention” is an objective 
concept and that patent scope should be limited to the invention. Liivak, supra note 43, at 5. 
One of us has criticized Liivak’s definition of the invention elsewhere. Tun-Jen Chiang, 
Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1211, 1237 & n.154 (2012). 
For present purposes, we merely note that, even if the invention could be defined in some 
objective manner, there would still be a second-order normative policy choice about whether 
to have patent scope governed by the linguistic meaning of the claim language or by the 
invention. Thus, we believe that the most significant issues raised by Liivak’s argument go 
to construction rather than interpretation. 
178.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006) (outlining the conditions for obtaining a patent). 
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To see this, consider the example given in Section I.A of the Wright 
brothers, who invented the first working airplane in the form of a wooden 
glider. Is their invention: 
“All flying machines,” including helicopters? 
“All flying machines with fixed wings,” including jets? 
“All wooden flying machines,” including World War I fighter planes that 
were much better than the Wright glider? 
“A single barely flying wooden glider, down to the paint color,” which 
would be instantly outdated? 
Each of these ideas can be accurately described as the invention; they differ 
only in their level of abstraction. There is no objectively correct answer to 
selecting among these competing ideas. Because there is no objective “true 
invention,” saying that judges should award patent scope according to the true 
invention creates a circularity: the true invention is ultimately whatever a judge 
finds it to be, and the judge that uses the true invention as his lodestar will 
simply end up importing his own beliefs about desirable patent scope into law. 
We should make clear that having judges make policy judgments about 
desirable patent scope is not necessarily a bad thing: because there is no 
objective “true invention,” somebody has to make the judgment call on the scope 
of the patent, and it is not clear there are better alternatives than having a judge 
do it. Nor is saying that judges make “policy” the same as saying that courts are 
super-legislatures that do whatever they feel like: judges may draw on a wide 
range of principles, from utilitarian economics to natural rights theory, to 
guide their decision-making. Our point is that the determination necessarily 
requires a judge to exercise normative judgment, and pretending that claim 
analysis is a linguistic question obscures this judicial policy-making role. In 
much of the existing literature, people speak as if the courts were simply 
debating what the patentee did in writing the claim language.179 This view is so 
pervasive that academics routinely criticize the Federal Circuit for not being 
policy-oriented enough.180 The obfuscation means that courts are relieved from 
having to explain and justify their policy decisions. 
 
179.  See supra Section I.B. 
180.  See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1671 (2003) (“The Federal Circuit has proven particularly resistant to considering patent 
policy in making its decisions.”); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 
29-33 (2010) (arguing that the Federal Circuit is formalist and resists considering policy 
arguments); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
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We should also make clear the nature of the policy disagreements at issue. 
Thus far, we have spoken of “textualists” and “anti-textualists” as if individual 
judges always fell into one camp or the other. But in fact judges sometimes 
oscillate between the approaches depending on other policy considerations, 
such as their first-order preferences on patent scope. That is, claims are written 
by patentees, and one can expect self-interested patentees to write the claim 
text broadly as a general matter. A textualist methodology will therefore tend 
to result in broader monopolies than an anti-textualist methodology. It is 
therefore no surprise that an individual judge can one day argue that the plain 
meaning of claim language should govern even when it results in a completely 
nonsensical invention, and the next day turn around and argue that the 
specification of the invention should override the plain meaning of claim 
text.181 The judge is simply being a fair weather textualist, who adopts 
textualism only when it produces an outcome that coincides with his first-
order preferences on patent scope.182 A judge who thinks that an invention is 
very significant (and that the patentee therefore deserves a broad monopoly) 
will favor textualism for that particular case. Stated this way, it should be clear 
that even a seemingly textualist judge might really be acting on his first-order 
normative preferences. Once again, our agenda is not to praise seemingly-
textualist judges or disparage seemingly-anti-textualist judges. Our point is to 
expose the policy disagreements that underlie claim construction disputes and 
explain why these disputes are not linguistic. 
3.  Conflating Linguistic Context with Policy Context 
A particular example of the confused nature of the discourse—which the 
conflated thinking has caused—is the misuse of the word “context.” 
 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1125-26 (2003) (arguing for measures to “dislodge 
the Federal Circuit from its rigid adherence to formalism”). 
181.  Compare Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (Plager, J., dissenting) (arguing for a plain meaning approach even when it 
causes the invention to be inoperative), with Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & 
Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Plager, J., concurring) (arguing that claims should 
be construed according to the specification of the invention). 
182.  See Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone 
Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 805 (2008) (“[O]bserving, say, textualist decisions in the world 
may tell us more about textualists than it tells us about textualism.”). 
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Anti-textualists in patent law routinely emphasize the importance of 
context to understanding language.183 They criticize textualist judges for their 
tendency to over-rely on dictionary definitions, because such definitions do not 
consider the context within which a disputed claim term appears.184 They 
argue that the specification is important to claim interpretation because it 
provides context.185 At a facial level, we agree with all of these statements. 
The problem is that there are two kinds of context. The first, which we will 
call the “linguistic context,” is context that helps an interpreter discern the 
linguistic meaning. The second, which we will call the “policy context,” is 
information that is relevant to resolving a policy issue under some second-
order normative framework. For example, if one thinks that society should seek 
to award the economically efficient degree of patent scope,186 then an 
important piece of policy context is what the patentee himself believed to be his 
invention (because it is generally economically inefficient to award more than 
this). 
To see the difference between these two types of context, consider again the 
example of Phillips. In Phillips, the key disagreement between the majority and 
the dissent is what to make of the specification’s statement that the invention 
comprises “bullet deflecting . . . baffles.” As linguistic context, the phrase tells 
us that the word “baffle” does not refer to something that inherently deflects 
bullets (because otherwise the “bullet deflecting” modifier is redundant). But, 
as policy context, it tells us that the patentee regarded it as crucial that the 
invention deflect bullets, and therefore it would be bad policy to award the 
patentee a monopoly covering non-bullet-deflecting objects. Although the 
statement unquestionably provides important context to analyzing the claim, 
 
183.  See, e.g., Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[C]laims . . . 
do not have meaning removed from the context from which they arose.”); Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 37, at 49-52; Mullally, supra note 152, at 365-71. 
184.  See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
“ordinary and customary meaning” of a claim term must be discerned by reference to “the 
context of the intrinsic record” and not by reference to “a dictionary, treatise, or other 
extrinsic source”). 
185.  See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The 
specification contains a written description of the invention . . . . Thus, the specification is 
always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.”). 
186.  The efficiency standard is the dominant paradigm for determining scope in the patent 
literature. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) 
(“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and 
the avoidance of monopolies . . . .”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). 
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its particular relevance depends on the kind of analysis (linguistic versus 
policy) that one is doing. 
In patent law debates, the two distinct concepts of “context” have been 
conflated. In rhetorical debates, anti-textualists emphasize the importance of 
linguistic context and the inadequacy of dictionaries alone to determine 
linguistic meaning.187 But in actual application to facts, they end up looking at 
policy context and making their decisions on that basis.188 Judge Lourie’s dissent 
in Phillips is not looking at the context of “bullet deflecting . . . baffles” for its 
linguistic implications. 
The same two-step occurs in the patent literature, where scholars 
rhetorically emphasize linguistic context but end up advocating for a policy 
analysis. For example, Burk and Lemley start with the proposition that the 
correct understanding of claim language depends on “context,”189 but their 
ultimate position is that courts should look to “the importance of the invention 
in the industry, the nature of the technology, how this invention relates to 
others in producing marketable products, and the relationship between the 
patentee’s invention and the accused device.”190 Peter Lee begins by criticizing 
a “literalist” approach that “deprioritizes contextual factors,”191 but what he 
really wants is for courts to look for “a patented invention’s technological 
contribution.”192 Kelly Mullally begins by noting that “words have no meaning 
apart from their context,”193 but then argues that courts should adopt a 
“substantive” methodology that construes claims according to “the context of 
the invention.”194 Finally, Chris Cotropia argues for “[c]ontextualizing the 
 
187.  See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477-78 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims 
are construed. Such person is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with 
an understanding of their meaning in the field . . . . Thus the court starts the 
decisionmaking process by reviewing the same resources as would that person, viz., the 
patent specification and the prosecution history.”). 
188.  See, e.g., Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“The specification contains a written description of the 
invention . . . . Thus, the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction 
analysis.” (emphasis added)). 
189.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 49-51. 
190.  Id. at 54. 
191.  Lee, supra note 2, at 103-04; see also supra text accompanying note 64 (criticizing the literalist 
approach). 
192.  Lee, supra note 2, at 105. 
193.  Mullally, supra note 152, at 365. 
194.  Id. at 369-70. 
 the interpretation-construction distinction in patent law 
583 
 
claim meaning within the complete patent document,”195 but what he really 
wants is for courts to look for “information about the inventive activity of the 
patentee.”196 Only by applying the interpretation-construction distinction can 
one see that these scholars are using two different versions of “context” in their 
arguments. 
The fact that “context” has become code for a look-for-the-real-invention 
policy analysis has a follow-on consequence, which is that textualists treat 
“context” as if it were a dirty word. This induces textualists to emphasize 
acontextual dictionary definitions above all else.197 Anti-textualists then 
rhetorically criticize the “dictionary uber alles” approach as ignoring context, 
and a vicious cycle of each side talking past the other is reinforced. 
Beyond the problem of talking past each other, the undue emphasis on 
dictionaries leads textualists to interpretations that are inaccurate. An example 
of this error is the dissent in Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, 
Inc.198 In Kinetic Concepts, the patent pertained to a type of medical treatment. 
The claim recited “a treatment for a wound,” and the question was whether 
“wound” meant any type of injury to body tissue generally or only an injury to 
skin. The majority held that it meant only injuries to skin,199 while Judge Dyk 
in dissent argued that it meant any type of injury.200 Judge Dyk’s primary 
argument was that, because the medical dictionary says that a “wound” means 
any kind of injury to body tissue, a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
understand this to be so.201 
To the extent that the dissent was looking for the linguistic meaning, it 
erred. It erred because, in the specification, the patentee describes placing a pad 
“onto the normal skin surrounding the wound.”202 This sentence contains the 
embedded semantic assumption that “wound” refers to something that happens 
to skin, in two ways: (1) it would make no sense to speak of “normal” skin if 
there weren’t something that could be considered “abnormal” skin, and the 
abnormal skin is the wound; (2) if “wound” did not refer to something that is 
 
195.  Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1880 (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
196.  Id. (emphasis added). 
197.  See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(emphasizing dictionaries). 
198.  554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
199.  Id. at 1019. 
200.  Id. at 1027-29 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
201.  Id. at 1028-29. 
202.  U.S. Patent No. 5,636,643, col. 11 ll. 9-10 (filed Mar. 9, 1993). 
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inherently on the skin, it would make no sense to speak of skin “surrounding” 
a wound. Because a reading of the specification would reveal that the patentee 
thought that the word “wound” semantically referred to objects on the skin, the 
intended reader of the patent would likewise come to this conclusion, which 
makes it the proper linguistic meaning.203 
As this example illustrates, context is essential to proper interpretation. 
And an important source of linguistic context for most patent claims will be the 
specification, which is a part of the same document, is written by the same 
author, and is directed to the same audience.204 We therefore agree that the 
context of the specification is essential to a proper understanding of the 
linguistic meaning. 
But our agreement is limited to use of linguistic context to understand 
linguistic meaning, which is not what the advocates of considering 
specification “context” have in mind. The majority in Kinetic Concepts (led by 
Judge Lourie) did not make any of the linguistic arguments we have outlined. 
Instead, the majority simply argued: “All of the examples described in the 
specification involve skin wounds. To construe ‘wound’ to include fistulae and 
‘pus pockets’ would thus expand the scope of the claims far beyond anything 
described in the specification.”205 This argument has nothing to do with 
linguistic context. It is a pure policy argument that it is unwise to allow 
patentees to cover more than what they invented and described in the 
specification. Again, the true driver of ex post dispute and ex ante uncertainty 
is not a lack of linguistic clarity in patent claims. 
4.  The Demise of the Construction-to-Save-Validity Doctrine 
Finally, it is worth noting that the interpretation-construction distinction 
explains both the existence of, and the demise of, the doctrine that claims 
 
203.  This represents a partial change in view for one of us. See Chiang, supra note 119, at 1125 
(arguing that the word “wound” meant all injuries). 
204.  The prosecution history, although not physically attached to the claims in the manner of the 
specification, can also provide relevant linguistic context in some circumstances. See, e.g., 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that a 
patentee specifically deleted the words “pressure jacket” from many of its claims during 
prosecution and that this suggested that the resulting claims did not necessarily include a 
pressure jacket). 
205.  Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted). 
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should be construed narrowly to save their validity.206 This doctrine says that a 
claim that is drafted more broadly than is legally allowable will be construed to 
conform to the legally allowable limit. As the Federal Circuit observed in 
Phillips, this doctrine is almost never openly invoked today.207 
As an initial matter, it is useful to see that the interpretation-construction 
distinction is indispensable to comprehending the doctrine. For this doctrine to 
ever be invoked, there must first be a conceptual two-step: a court must first 
interpret the claim broadly according to its linguistic meaning, and then construe 
it narrowly to save its validity. If it instead says that the claim meaning 
automatically equals the invention, then the construction-to-save-validity 
doctrine is a conceptual impossibility: the claim will always cover the invention 
and there will never be anything to “save.” 
And this understanding also allows us to see why the construction-to-save-
validity doctrine is almost never openly invoked by courts today: it is 
superfluous. A textualist judge will not want this doctrine because it construes 
claims to depart from the linguistic meaning; an anti-textualist judge does not 
need this doctrine because he can use “normal” claim analysis principles to 
match the claim scope to the real invention. Moreover, invoking the 
construction-to-save-validity doctrine is politically costly for the court precisely 
because it requires the interpretation-construction two-step to be made 
expressly, which requires the court to explicitly say that the executive branch 
(the PTO) erred in issuing an overbroad claim that the court must then “save” 
by construction. The direct method allows the court to camouflage its policy 
role, and its conflict with executive branch decisions, by saying that the 
patentee’s claim “meant” the narrower meaning all along. 
The same insight applies to explain the demise of the “reverse doctrine of 
equivalents.” This doctrine allows a court to explicitly hold an accused device to 
be encompassed by the language of a claim yet non-infringing because it falls 
outside of the patentee’s invention.208 The doctrine is practically dead,209 but 
remains a favorite of law professors.210 
 
206.  Turrill v. Mich. S. &c. R.R. Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 491, 510 (1863). Structurally, this idea is 
similar to the avoidance canon in statutory construction. 
207.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed Cir. 2005) (en banc) (stating that the 
doctrine has not been applied broadly). 
208.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950) (describing 
the reverse doctrine of equivalents). 
209.  Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]his court has 
never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”). 
210.  See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 895 (“The Federal Circuit’s effective abrogation 
of the reverse doctrine of equivalents remains intensely controversial . . . .”); Burk & Lemley, 
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Our analysis explains why the reverse doctrine of equivalents finds no favor 
among judges. Like the construction-to-save-validity doctrine, the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents requires judges to explicitly recognize that the language 
of a claim is broader than the real invention. This is politically costly for 
judges. There is no motivation for a judge to incur this political cost when the 
same policy outcome can be achieved by saying that the claim “meant” the 
narrow scope all along. Once again, without the interpretation-construction 
distinction, judicial decision-making is less transparent and judicial policy 
choices are obscured. Not only do scholars end up on a wild goose chase, many 
do not even realize that they are chasing geese. 
Ultimately, we think that, if a court believes that a particular claim’s 
linguistic meaning is overbroad (compared to some conception of the real 
invention), it would be better and more transparent for that court to either 
invalidate the claim outright or at least explicitly invoke the construction-to-
save-validity doctrine or the reverse doctrine of equivalents, rather than 
surreptitiously achieving the narrowing result by saying that the claim “meant” 
the narrower scope all along. It is naïve, however, to merely advocate for 
greater transparency without appreciating the judicial incentives against it, and 
we have no good solutions for overcoming those judicial incentives. Our 
primary contribution is rather to provide a conceptual tool that allows other 
participants in the patent system to more clearly see when judges are in fact 
engaged in surreptitious atextual construction, which over the long term can 
reduce the payoffs of non-transparency and thus make greater formal 
transparency a more likely result. 
D.  Disputes over Gap-Filling Construction 
Although we think that normative judicial disagreement about whether to 
follow claim text is the primary cause of claim analysis disputes, we do not 
wish to portray this as the only issue in claim analysis. Sometimes—though we 
think less often than the literature portrays it—claim analysis disputes arise 
because the claim language is ambiguous or vague. As we will explain in this 
Section, however, even some such disputes are disputes over construction. 
 
supra note 1, at 1773; Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: 
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994). 
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1.  The Problem of Vagueness 
The primary example of a situation where there is genuine linguistic 
uncertainty, but the issue is of construction and not of interpretation, is the 
situation of vagueness. In the conventional literature, it is common to say that 
claims are too “vague,” that such vagueness causes uncertainty in patent rights, 
and that courts need to do a better job at “interpretation” to reduce the 
uncertainty.211 Such phrasing—which at bottom is a restatement of the 
linguistic indeterminacy thesis—reflects fundamental conceptual errors and 
causes serious analytical mistakes. Properly understood, a problem of 
vagueness cannot be resolved using interpretation, and attempts to do so result 
in incoherent decisions. 
Consider, for example, Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Technologies, Inc.,212 which 
involved a claim to a voltage regulator placed “near” a device that was being 
powered. The term “near” is vague—it naturally raises the question of how 
near is near enough—and this was the issue in dispute. As an intrinsic matter, 
this dispute could not have been resolved using interpretation: no amount of 
linguistic knowledge will tell us the precise line between “near” and “not near.” 
The Federal Circuit, however, tried anyway. It purported to issue an 
interpretation stating that “the term ‘near’ means close to or at the load [i.e., the 
device being powered].”213 
As an interpretation of language, there is nothing inaccurate about what the 
Federal Circuit said. But its “interpretation” didn’t engage with the actual issue 
in dispute: how close is close enough? On that question, all the Federal Circuit 
did was say that “[a] skilled artisan in distributed power systems would know 
where to place the regulator” such that “low voltage/high currents will not be 
delivered over relatively long distances.”214 In short, on the actual issue in 
dispute, the Federal Circuit did nothing except replace one term (“near”) with 
another term (“close to”) with the exact same linguistic meaning,215 and 
essentially kicked the can to a swearing match among expert witnesses that will 
 
211.  See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56-62. 
212.  599 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
213.  Id. at 1349. 
214.  Id. (emphasis added). 
215.  This phenomenon has not escaped notice, but the authors who have discussed it tend to 
over-generalize the scope of the phenomenon. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1797-98 
(“[C]laim constructions are unlikely to help a judge or jury understand the patent claim 
because they take simple English words and replace them with more simple English 
words.”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 40 (arguing that current claim analysis is broadly a 
“meaningless exercise” that “replaces [words] with more words”). 
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be adjudicated by a jury. By conceptualizing vagueness as a problem of 
interpretation, the final result is to abandon reasoned claim analysis in favor of 
a black-box jury decision on the substantive issue. 
Much of the problem with the present conceptualization is that it does not 
distinguish between vagueness and ambiguity, and instead uses “vagueness” as 
a label for all linguistic uncertainty (or, even worse, as a label for legal 
uncertainty).216 As we have explained above, in the philosophy of language, 
“vagueness” refers not to all types of linguistic underdeterminacy, but to the 
specific situation of a word or phrase having fuzzy boundaries (e.g., words 
such as “near” or “approximately”217). This is different from “ambiguity,” 
which refers to situations where words have more than one sense.218 Conflating 
the two types of linguistic defects is a conceptual mistake and leads to using the 
wrong analytical tools: although linguistic tools can generally resolve problems 
of apparent ambiguity, they simply cannot resolve problems of vagueness. 
When a particular claim term is vague and the dispute falls within the resulting 
construction zone, courts must look beyond the claim language to construct a 
precise line to resolve the dispute. 
We should note that this second condition (that the dispute falls within the 
construction zone) is quite important, and many cases that at first blush look 
like disputes about vagueness are in fact not. For example, in Marine Polymer, 
the linguistic meaning of “biocompatible” is a material of low reactivity.219 This 
is vague, because there is a reasonable question of how “low” is low enough. 
But Judge Lourie’s proposed line—that only a material of absolutely zero 
detectable reactivity is biocompatible—is outside of the realm of reasonable 
 
216.  See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56-62 (using “vagueness” and “ambiguity” 
interchangeably). The literature also tends to conflate vagueness and generality. See, e.g., id. 
at 198-200 (arguing that software patent claims are particularly vague because software is 
abstract); Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 103, 120 (2008) (conflating abstraction and vagueness); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. 
Applera Corp., 605 F.3d 1347, 1348 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Plager, J., dissenting from denial of 
panel rehearing) (arguing that broad claims are “inherently ambiguous”). This is erroneous. 
It is true that general language is often uncertain in its legal effect—courts are more likely to 
engage in atextual construction when the claim is textually very broad—but legal 
uncertainty is not the same as linguistic uncertainty, and, moreover, not all linguistic 
uncertainty is caused by vagueness. To take the extreme example, there is nothing vague 
about a claim to “everything.” 
217.  See, e.g., Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“near”); Power 
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 671, 682-83 (D. Del. 
2010) (“approximately”). 
218.  See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
219.  Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(opinion of Dyk, J.). 
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debate, because the patent’s language specifically contemplates biocompatible 
materials with an elution test score of one (which indicates some detectable 
reactivity).220 Thus, although the word “biocompatible” is vague, this 
vagueness is not what is causing the dispute. Judge Lourie’s proposed 
construction goes outside the zone where language underspecifies—it is like 
construing a directive to “drive slowly” to require drivers to completely stop. 
Rather than a good faith disagreement about how to draw lines in the face of 
vague language, Marine Polymer is really a dispute about whether to follow the 
language at all. The vagueness of the language—if one ever got that far—was a 
happenstance that had no relevance to the actual dispute. 
With the qualifications that not every vague claim causes litigation and 
uncertainty, and that many broad or apparently ambiguous claims are not 
vague at all, it remains true that vague claims do exist and do cause 
uncertainty. But this is not a major part of our analysis, for two reasons. First, 
there does not appear to be systematic disagreement in the same way as there is 
in the specification-first versus dictionary-first methodological dispute; rather, 
the construction of lines to resolve vagueness appears to have no systematic 
formula or theory of construction.221 Thus, there is variance and uncertainty, 
but no one has said anything useful about it because it is an ad hoc, claim-by-
claim form of random uncertainty. Second, our main practical point in this 
Article is that the uncertainty problem is not amenable to the linguistic 
solutions that have been the focus of the existing literature. The presence of 
vagueness in patent claims reinforces rather than undermines this point 
because the problem of constructing lines for applying vague concepts is not 
amenable to linguistic solutions. 
2.  The Problem of Deliberate Ambiguity 
One problem often noted by the conventional literature, for which 
interpretative solutions are advocated, is the problem of deliberate 
ambiguity.222 In order to understand this problem, it must first be noted that 
patentees have an inbuilt incentive to be disingenuous: to portray the claim 
 
220.  See supra text accompanying note 175. 
221.  See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he word 
‘about’ does not have a universal meaning in patent claims, and . . . the meaning depends on 
the technological facts of the particular case.”); Young, 492 F.3d at 1346 (refusing to quantify 
“near”). 
222.  See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(speculating that the patentee may have made “a conscious attempt to create ambiguity 
about the scope of the claims”); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56-57. 
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narrowly to the PTO examiner (to persuade the examiner to issue the patent) 
while portraying the same claim broadly to competitors (to deter 
competition).223 Patentees accordingly have an incentive to write claim 
language in an ambiguous manner in order to facilitate this kind of two-faced 
argument. The literature often argues that such intentional ambiguity is 
pervasive and causes significant uncertainty in claim analysis.224 
We acknowledge that intentional patentee ambiguity is a real concern, but 
two further points are important. First, we think the problem of intentional 
ambiguity in claim language is less serious than the literature has portrayed it 
to be.225 Second, to the extent that the problem occurs, it cannot be solved by 
better linguistic tools but requires a policy solution. 
Let us first provide a concrete example of what deliberate ambiguity is and 
how it can occur. In Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,226 the 
patentee (Plant Genetics) invented a new type of plant seed that was resistant 
to herbicide. Specifically, Plant Genetics created the new type of seed by 
infecting it with bacterium and then regenerating it.227 
Importantly, at the time that it filed the patent, Plant Genetics could only 
get its infect-and-regenerate technique to work on one type of plant, known as 
“dicots.” It could not successfully regenerate another type of plant, known as 
“monocots.”228 Despite this, Plant Genetics initially filed a claim that explicitly 
covered all herbicide-resistant plant seeds. The PTO examiner rejected the 
broad claim, on the reasoning that Plant Genetics had not taught how to make 
herbicide-resistant monocots and therefore was not entitled to a patent 
covering herbicide-resistant monocots.229 It was only entitled to dicots. 
Faced with this rejection, Plant Genetics then amended the claim to state 
that the seed had to be “susceptible to infection and transformation by 
 
223.  BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57. This strategy is related to the notion of “acoustic 
separation.” See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation 
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
224.  BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57; Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1752-53; Seymore, 
supra note 2, at 637-38. 
225.  A distinction should be drawn between patentees intentionally using ambiguous language to 
make a two-faced argument, and patentees invoking ambiguous case law to do so. To the 
extent that a two-faced argument is based simply on conflicting case law, then interpretative 
solutions will obviously not work. 
226.  315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
227.  Id. at 1337-38. 
228.  Id. at 1344. 
229.  Id. 
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Agrobacterium and capable of regeneration thereafter.”230 The examiner clearly 
understood this new language to limit the claim to dicots. He accordingly 
granted the patent.231 
However, a careful reader will note that the amended claim does not 
literally say “dicots.” It literally covers any plant that can be infected and 
regenerated—the trick is that, at the time, the only plants that could be infected 
and regenerated were dicots. What later happened was that the accused 
infringer (DeKalb) managed to infect and regenerate monocots and thereby 
produce the same herbicide resistance.232 Plant Genetics then sued DeKalb for 
infringement, on the theory that DeKalb’s accused product (a monocot) was 
literally “susceptible to infection and transformation by Agrobacterium and 
capable of regeneration thereafter.” 
Plant Genetics therefore shows that deliberate ambiguity can occur and is a 
real concern. But we think Plant Genetics also illustrates why the problem is less 
serious at a systemic level than the conventional literature has presented it. 
Although Plant Genetics provides an example of a patentee who succeeded in 
convincing the examiner to view the claim language differently from its 
common meaning, we think it also illustrates the intrinsic difficulty of the task: 
it takes a rather gullible or inattentive examiner to miss the patentee’s sleight-
of-hand.233 A more sophisticated examiner might well have questioned why 
Plant Genetics chose to write such convoluted language (“susceptible to 
infection and transformation by Agrobacterium and capable of regeneration 
thereafter”) rather than simply write “dicot”; and if the examiner had insisted 
on explicitly using the word “dicot” in the amended claim, there would have 
been no dispute later. 
In other words, although the conventional literature convinces us that 
patentees are acting deliberately, it has not convinced us that they regularly 
succeed in creating deliberate ambiguities.234 For there to be a true ambiguity in 
the language, the patentee must do more than simply hope or intend different 
members of the audience to understand the claim in contradictory ways; he 
must actually create two different understandings (i.e., he must bamboozle the 
 
230.  Id. at 1338. 
231.  See id. at 1345 (“We conclude that the plant and seed claims were only allowed because the 
limitation on transformation and regeneration was added.”). 
232.  Id. at 1338. 
233.  PTO examiners are instructed to adopt a “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard 
when approaching claim language, in order to guard against patentee tricks. In re 
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
234.  See supra text accompanying notes 112-116 (explaining that patentee intent alone does not 
control the linguistic meaning). 
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PTO examiner into seeing the claim language differently than other people in 
the art). The conventional literature has not demonstrated empirically that 
patentees regularly succeed in bamboozling PTO examiners and competitors to 
come to different linguistic understandings;235 it has only pointed to the 
patentee motivation to attempt such tricks.236 While we are open to being 
convinced that deliberate ambiguity is a pervasive problem, the commonly 
cited evidence of patentee motivation is not enough to prove this assertion.237 
3.  The Problem of Irreducible Ambiguity 
The problem of deliberate ambiguity that we discussed in the previous 
subsection can be conceptualized as part of a broader category—problems of 
irreducible ambiguity. Although most instances of ambiguity in text are only 
apparent (i.e., there is in fact a single correct meaning to the text when viewed 
in context, but without sufficient context the single meaning is difficult to 
discern), there are situations where the ambiguity is genuine and irreducible. 
Plant Genetics provides an example of such a situation: where the patentee 
succeeds in conveying two distinct meanings to different portions of the 
intended audience (a narrow meaning to the examiner and a broad meaning to 
competitors), the text has multiple meanings, and no amount of interpretation 
can overcome this problem. The dispute requires construction to resolve. 
Although genuine ambiguity is perhaps more likely to happen when a 
patentee intentionally seeks to create the result, patentee mal-intent is not an 
absolute condition for the phenomenon. Irreducible ambiguity occurs 
whenever the communicative content or linguistic meaning includes multiple 
 
235.  Compare BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57 (asserting that “the Patent Office does a poor 
job of monitoring the clarity of patent claims”), with Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is 
the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 201 (2008) (“The PTO is doing a better 
job than many people think.”). 
236.  See supra text accompanying note 224. It is worth adding that the patentee motivation exists 
only in a limited range of circumstances. A patentee has the incentive to use ambiguous 
claim language (instead of clear and broad language) only if he fears PTO rejection. But if 
the PTO is highly incompetent (as the proponents of the deliberate ambiguity theory 
generally argue), then rejection is not a serious concern, and patentees thus would not 
attempt deliberate ambiguity. Conversely, if the PTO is highly competent, then a deliberate 
ambiguity strategy cannot succeed. Only in a Goldilocks range where the PTO is competent 
enough for patentees to fear rejection, but not competent enough to actually detect patentee 
chicanery, will deliberate ambiguity be a problem. 
237.  An additional point is that, even if someone were to empirically prove that PTO examiners 
are regularly deceived by patentee tricks, the obvious solution would be to hire better PTO 
examiners. It is not obvious that a more drastic solution (such as abolishing claims) is 
warranted if the problem is deliberate ambiguity. 
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senses that cannot be eliminated by resort to context. A possible example of 
this phenomenon, we think, is Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America 
LLC,238 which involved a claim to actuators that are “attached” to a game pad 
(and which cause the game pad to vibrate when playing computer games). The 
question was whether “attached” referred only to attachments to the exterior of 
the game pad, or included attachments both inside and outside the game pad. 
This mattered because, in the accused device, the actuator was embedded 
within the game pad itself.239 
As an initial matter, let us clarify that this is not a problem of vagueness but 
of ambiguity: the issue here is not of blurred boundaries (no one is really 
asking how closely attached is close enough) but of two distinct senses of 
“attached” that denote two different concepts at different levels of generality. 
In normal speech, people sometimes use the word “attached” broadly to denote 
affixing both within or without—for example, what we call an “attachment” to 
an email is part of the email itself. At other times, however, people use 
“attached” narrowly to denote an affixation that is external to the object—it 
would be regarded as quite odd, for example, to say that a person’s bones are 
“attached” to his body. As a matter of ordinary usage, both senses are possible, 
though we would say that the latter sense is more common. 
Looking at the context of the patent document does not clarify this 
ambiguity, because different passages of the specification point in different 
directions. One passage of the specification stated: “a vibratory actuator can be 
attached to [the] outer side of the throttle handle.”240 Although at first blush 
this might be taken to favor reading “attached” to refer only to exterior 
attachments (especially if one conflates linguistic meaning with the invention), 
it actually has the opposite effect. The sentence says that an actuator can be—
and thus by negative implication does not have to be—attached to the outer 
surface.241 
However, other passages of the specification raise the opposite linguistic 
inference. For example, the patent specification states that “actuators may be 
attached to pre-existing rudder pedal units, or may be embedded within the 
plastic or metal structure that comprises the rudder pedals during their 
 
238.  669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
239.  Id. at 1365. 
240.  Id. at 1367 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
241.  Id. at 1368 (“If the applicant had redefined the term ‘attached’ to mean only ‘attached to an 
outer surface,’ then it would have been unnecessary to specify that the attachment was ‘to 
[an] outer surface’ in the specification.” (alteration in original)). 
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manufacture.”242 In a mirror reversal of the first passage, at first blush this 
second passage might be taken to favor reading the claim to cover both exterior 
attachments and embedded actuators (because the passage seems to foresee 
embedded actuators as part of the invention). But, as a linguistic matter, this 
passage is distinguishing between things that are “attached” to the exterior of a 
game pad and things that are “embedded” within the interior—it uses 
“attached” to refer only to the former situation and thus implicitly counter-
distinguishes it from the latter. The correct linguistic inference from this 
second passage is therefore that “attached” means only exterior attachments. 
In our view, Thorner is a genuinely hard case as a matter of interpretation, 
and reasonable linguistic arguments can be made on both sides. It is even 
possible to conclude that, ultimately, the patentee was so self-contradictory and 
confused when using the word “attached” that a skilled artisan reading the 
patent would have no idea which sense is the correct one.243 To the extent this 
is the case, Thorner is an illustration of our point that irreducible ambiguity can 
occur, and require construction to resolve, even without any intentional 
misconduct on the part of the patentee. 
We hasten to add, however, that we do not think that cases of irreducible 
ambiguity (either intentional or innocent) are very common. Not every 
situation where language might appear somewhat self-contradictory is a case of 
irreducible ambiguity; often the balance of linguistic clues will favor one 
interpretation over the other. For example, in Subsection II.C.3, we explained 
how we thought the court in Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc.244 was 
correct to interpret “animal” in the particular patent to include humans, 
because the patentee had an explicit clause that specified the definition of 
“animal” to include all members of the kingdom of Animalia. We thought the 
explicit clause outweighed the fact that the broad definition of “animal” caused 
some of the remaining language in the patent specification to become quite 
odd, such as where the patentee discussed “raising animals” by feeding them, 
which is not usually language that one would use in discussing humans.245 
Some amount of internal tension is common in language, and that mere fact 
does not render text hopelessly indeterminate. Even with Thorner, we are not 
fully convinced that the word “attached” was irreducibly ambiguous. We have 
a slight preference for an interpretation of “attached” to mean only external 
 
242.  U.S. Patent No. 6,422,941 col. 33 ll. 14-17 (filed Sept. 23, 1997) (emphasis added). 
243.  In real life, we can never be certain that a particular ambiguity is irresolvable, because it is 
always possible that more context will reveal a single correct meaning. 
244.  579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
245.  See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
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attachments, because we believe that is the more common usage of the word in 
ordinary language and we think that the negative inference created by the “can 
be” clause is not strong (it is possible to read the clause as alternatively saying 
that no vibratory actuator is needed at all). In our view, therefore, the balance 
of linguistic clues in Thorner leans slightly in favor of the “external attachment 
only” interpretation.246 
v. why disputes are not about linguistic meaning 
In the prior Part, we discussed our theory of why claim analysis disputes 
are primarily over construction. Judges primarily disagree about two things: 
(1) what the invention is, and (2) if the invention is different from the 
linguistic meaning of the claim, which one wins? These are essential policy 
judgments that are not objective or factual. 
In contrast, much of the claim construction literature diagnoses the 
problem as the linguistic meaning of claim text being unclear. In this Part, we 
provide some rebuttal to these arguments. In the main, our argument will be 
threefold: First, the leading cases on claim analysis do not involve ambiguous 
claim terms. Second, the high rate of reversal by the Federal Circuit does not 
prove linguistic ambiguity. Third, to the extent the existing literature has 
articulated a clear theory of why claim text is expected to be ambiguous—
beyond citing high reversal rates—those articulated theories are not plausible. 
A.  Our Existing Interpretative Tools Are Adequate 
Our first point of note is that, of the important cases involving claim 
analysis, none involved any significant linguistic ambiguity. We will consider 
the three most prominent claim analysis cases, namely Phillips, Cybor Corp. v. 
FAS Technologies, Inc.,247 and Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.248 
We start again with Phillips. As already discussed in detail, the claim term 
in Phillips—“baffle”—was not linguistically ambiguous. The dispute was 
 
246.  The court disagreed with our analysis and held that the “plain meaning of the term 
‘attached’ encompasses either an external or internal attachment.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367. 
Although we find the court’s ultimate decision to be reasonable, we also think its 
characterization of the meaning as “plain” was an overstatement. 
247.  138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
248.  52 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Markman II), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) 
(Markman III). 
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entirely about whether the invention might have been required to deflect bullets 
and whether the invention or the linguistic meaning should govern.249 
The same is true of Cybor. The patent in Cybor concerned a dispenser for 
industrial liquids, which contained at least two “pumping means” (the term in 
dispute).250 There is no realistic ambiguity in the term “pumping means,” at 
least in so far as it clearly covered a pump, which was the accused product.251 
The problem was that the patentee had (arguably) represented to the PTO that 
the invention was something that could not draw from an external reservoir, 
which the accused pump did.252 A dispute about whether the patentee had 
misled the PTO, or whether the inventive idea requires an external reservoir, is 
not a dispute about the semantic definition of “pumping means.” 
Third, the dispute in Markman concerned a patent for a system for 
managing dry cleaning. The claim recited a system for keeping track of the 
“inventory” of a dry cleaning store. The dispute concerned whether 
“inventory” meant the number of articles of clothing, or the dollar value of the 
clothing.253 The defendant’s accused device only kept track of the dollar value 
of clothing, so it infringed under one reading and not the other.254 
This claim analysis issue concededly represents a problem of interpretation, 
and not of construction. The word “inventory” was ambiguous: either reading 
is plausible if the word is taken by itself. To accountants, “inventory” generally 
means keeping track of cash value, while to a warehouse foreman it generally 
means keeping track of physical objects. Markman thus demonstrates that 
claim terms can be ambiguous. 
But as much as Markman demonstrates that linguistic ambiguities can 
occur, resolving the ambiguity at issue was not very hard, and existing 
linguistic tools were quite sufficient for the job. A simple reading of the patent 
specification revealed that it talked a lot about articles of clothing but not about 
keeping track of cash totals,255 making it very likely that the word “inventory” 
referred to physical objects, and not cash values.256 Every judge who considered 
 
249.  See supra Section III.B. 
250.  Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451. 
251.  Id. at 1452-53. 
252.  Id. at 1456-57. 
253.  Markman II, 52 F.3d at 974-75 (noting that the substantive question turns on “whether the 
term ‘inventory’ requires as part of its meaning ‘articles of clothing’”). 
254.  Id. at 973. 
255.  U.S. Patent No. Re. 33,054 (filed Aug. 28, 1987). 
256.  It is important to distinguish our usage of the specification from that of the anti-textualists. 
We are making an inference based on ordinary English usage conventions, not based on the 
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the question agreed with this interpretation.257 The only dispute in the case was 
over the procedural question of who decides: namely, whether disputes over 
claim analysis should be adjudicated by judges or juries.258 Once that 
procedural question was decided (the Supreme Court held that judges should 
perform claim analysis), the correct interpretation of “inventory” was treated 
largely as an afterthought.259 Because the interpretative issue was simple and 
unanimously resolved using existing interpretative tools, Markman does not 
provide strong support for the linguistic indeterminacy thesis. In fact, it 
undermines it. 
To be sure, we have not done a systematic study of all litigated cases—such 
a study is not practically feasible. As such, there is always the possibility that 
the supposedly “canonical” cases that we have analyzed are not in fact 
representative of the broader claim analysis debate; and a reader can likely 
point to counter-examples of cases260 where an ambiguity is both (a) difficult 
to resolve and (b) the genuine cause of disagreement.261 But we do think our 
sample is sufficiently suggestive to cast significant doubt on the view that 
linguistic ambiguity in patent claims is pervasive and causes an epidemic of 
claim analysis disputes, especially because the canonical cases presumably 
reflect the courts’ own judgments of what constitute representative cases. 
 
patentee’s inventive contribution. As a matter of common experience, any document that 
talks a lot about physical objects, and spends no time talking about cash totals, probably 
uses “inventory” in the sense of physical objects. In this manner, the general subject matter 
of the patent (sometimes known as “the invention”) can sometimes provide relevant 
linguistic context. But this is very different from an argument that “inventory” must mean 
articles of clothing because the patentee only conceived a system to keep track of physical 
articles and thus is not legally entitled to claim more, which is what anti-textualists usually 
mean when they argue for interpreting claims according to the “invention.” See Winans v. 
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853) (holding that claims should be interpreted according to 
what the patentee has a “just right” to cover). 
257.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (Markman 
I) (“Inventory means articles of clothing, not just dollars.”); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 982 
(holding the same); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring) (arguing for 
deference to juries); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 998 (Rader, J., concurring) (agreeing that “cash 
transaction totals are not ‘inventory’”); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 1026 (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (arguing for a jury determination); Markman III, 517 U.S. at 391 (affirming 
Federal Circuit). 
258.  Markman III, 517 U.S. at 372 (“The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called 
patent claim . . . is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court.”). 
259.  Id. at 391 (affirming the judgment without considering the interpretative dispute). 
260.  See, e.g., supra Subsection IV.D.3 (discussing Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 
F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
261.  We should note that these are separate conditions. Our argument does not require 
interpretation to be easy, it merely requires interpretation to not be the real issue in dispute. 
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B.  Reversal Rates Do Not Prove Linguistic Ambiguity 
More than anything else, the existing literature has relied on the high rate 
at which the Federal Circuit reverses in claim analysis cases as ipso facto proof 
that claims are linguistically ambiguous.262 This is wrong. 
As an initial matter, relying on reversal rates as a measure of uncertainty 
has a well-known selection problem: the most uncertain cases are the most 
likely to end up in litigation.263 But our contention is more fundamental and 
does not depend on the selection effect. The existing literature is wrong to infer 
linguistic uncertainty from reversal rates because reversal rates speak only to 
legal uncertainty and not linguistic uncertainty. The fact that judges disagree 
about legal outcomes does not prove that the uncertainty has linguistic roots. 
Legal uncertainty in claim analysis can arise either because (1) judges are all 
faithful textualists but the linguistic meaning is ambiguous, or (2) some judges 
are not faithful textualists and therefore don’t follow the linguistic meaning. 
What the existing literature explicitly or implicitly assumes is some version of 
(1). What we have shown in Part IV is that this is simply not the case. The 
existing uncertainty in patent law—and the high reversal rate—occurs not 
because judges are all textualists but disagree over the correct linguistic 
meaning, but because some judges are not textualists and don’t follow the 
linguistic meaning. When a textualist district judge meets an anti-textualist 
appellate panel (or vice versa), a reversal can occur without any linguistic 
ambiguity whatsoever. 
 
262.  See, e.g., Burk, supra note 2, at 116-17 (arguing that the reversal rate indicates that “plain 
meaning is not so plain”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1744-45 (arguing that the 
prospect of reversal makes claim construction inherently uncertain); Chen, supra note 48, at 
1178-80 (arguing that judicial disagreement proves “as a matter of logic” that patent claims 
are . . . characterized by multiple reasonable interpretations rather than a single true 
meaning”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 37 (arguing that “[c]laim interpretation is just not a 
uniform process”); Menell et al., supra note 1, at 715-16 (citing the high reversal rate for 
claim construction rulings); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve 
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2001) (arguing for expedited appeal for patent 
claims given the rate of reversal). 
263.  Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 985 (2010). See generally George 
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) 
(describing selection effects). 
 the interpretation-construction distinction in patent law 
599 
 
C.  Theories of Linguistic Ambiguity Are Not Plausible 
Beyond the fallacious assertion that high reversal rates prove linguistic 
ambiguity, scholars have articulated three more detailed theories of why claims 
would be linguistically ambiguous. In the Subsections below, we will address 
each of these theories. 
1.  The Scientific Jargon Theory 
The most frequently given reason for why patent claims are expected to be 
linguistically uncertain is that patent claims involve highly technical 
language,264 which supposedly can only be understood by a person of skill in 
the art.265 In many ways, this is identical to saying that the language is 
uncertain because it is unfamiliar—text written in scientific jargon is often 
compared to a foreign language like Greek. And we concede the possibility that 
this is a cause of uncertainty. Yet for three reasons we are skeptical that this is a 
major explanation. 
The first reason is that judges seem to have the same vehement claim 
analysis disputes even about the simplest non-scientific terms. As Dan Burk 
and Mark Lemley note, there are disagreements about terms such as “‘a,’ ‘or,’ 
‘to,’ ‘including,’ and ‘through.’”266 This suggests that some reason for 
disagreement that equally applies to simple terms—e.g., policy fights about the 
invention—is more responsible for the uncertainty. 
The second reason—a mirror point of the first—is that disputes over 
complex terms don’t seem to happen very often. In the highest “ranked” claim 
analysis cases (i.e., those decided by the Supreme Court or the en banc Federal 
Circuit), the disputed terms were respectively “manufacture,”267 “inventory,”268 
 
264.  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 180, at 29-30 (arguing that patent claim interpretation is 
“cognitively demanding”); Moore, supra note 262, at 3-4 (questioning judges’ ability to 
determine the meaning of highly technical patent terms); Rai, supra note 49, at 881-82 
(noting that “the typical judge is unlikely to be a person skilled in the relevant art”); John 
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1413, 1475 (2003) (arguing that patent cases require “technological decisions”). 
265.  Nard, supra note 1, at 6 (“[P]atents are written by and for persons having ordinary skill in 
the art.”). The scientific jargon theory should be distinguished from another kind of 
argument, which is that claims are written in legally complex language. See Fromer, supra 
note 117, at 560 (noting that those “trained in the relevant art” often find legal jargon 
incomprehensible). Legally complex language is familiar to judges. 
266.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1744 (collecting citations). 
267.  Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570-74 (1876). 
268.  Markman III, 517 U.S. at 375. 
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“pumping means,”269 “baffle,”270 and “biocompatible.”271 Of these, only 
“biocompatible” can be plausibly characterized as scientific jargon—and 
nobody in Marine Polymer suggested that there was a specialized definition of 
“biocompatible” that was known to scientists but not lay judges.272 In sum, 
courts can have vehement fights about non-scientific terms, and they seem to 
be fighting primarily about non-scientific terms. Although these canonical 
cases might be unrepresentative of the broader population of litigated patent 
cases, we do think this sample is sufficiently suggestive to cast doubt on the 
scientific jargon theory, and we are not aware of any contrary empirical study 
that shows disputes over scientific terms to be common. The only article that 
systematically considers the question reaches the same conclusion that we 
do.273 
Our third reason for skepticism towards the scientific jargon theory is that 
judges already have enormous resources at their disposal to educate themselves 
about scientific terms. Quite obviously, judges have paid experts and the best 
technical dictionaries that the parties’ money can buy. Even if we are concerned 
that paid experts might be biased, district courts can (and do) appoint technical 
advisors for themselves,274 or alternatively can delegate claim analysis disputes 
to technically trained special masters to decide.275 Yet none of these tools seem 
to have any perceptible effect on the claim uncertainty problem, as evidenced 
by the ever-increasing number of articles and judicial cases complaining about 
the problem and suggesting new solutions.276 If a sick patient has received 
 
269.  Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456-60 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
270.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
271.  Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
272.  See id. at 1358 (opinion of Lourie, J.) (“[T]he district court did not find that ‘biocompatible’ 
had a plain and ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art.”); id. at 1367 (opinion of Dyk, J.) 
(arguing only that “the specification defines ‘biocompatible’”). As we explained in 
Subsection IV.B.3, the real cause of dispute in Marine Polymer was a policy disagreement. 
273.  Osenga, supra note 3, at 90 & n.151 (“Most of the terms the court construes are not technical 
terms.”). 
274.  Nard, supra note 1, at 66 & n.273; see also TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 
1377-81 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (approving the use of a technical advisor for claim construction). 
275.  See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, A Study of the Role and Impact of Special Masters in 
Patent Cases, FED. JUD. CENTER (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup 
/specmapa.pdf/$file/specmapa.pdf. 
276.  See supra notes 1-9. In a recent article, Jonas Anderson and Peter Menell find that the 
reversal rate has declined after Phillips, Anderson & Menell, supra note 48, but they attribute 
this to the Federal Circuit giving “informal deference” to district courts rather than to judges 
actually getting better at claim analysis. In another empirical study, Polk Wagner and Lee 
Petherbridge find that “the Phillips opinion . . . has utterly failed in advancing the Federal 
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numerous treatments based on a diagnosis, with no perceptible benefit, a good 
doctor should probably rethink the initial diagnosis. Our argument is the same 
regarding the scientific jargon diagnosis for claim uncertainty. 
2.  The Evolving Language Theory 
The second theory of why claims are ambiguous, articulated by Mark 
Lemley, is that language evolves and thus old terms become hard to 
understand. According to Lemley: 
[T]he meaning of particular terms . . . will frequently change over time. 
Indeed, the risk of change in the meaning of terms over time is 
particularly great in patent law, because patents necessarily involve new 
ideas, and the process of assigning terms to describe those new ideas is 
not static.277 
The problem with this evolving language theory of linguistic uncertainty is 
that such evolution almost never happens in the twenty-year duration of a 
patent,278 if we have a proper understanding of what constitutes linguistic 
evolution. In our definition, the linguistic meaning of a word changes—and 
thus becomes potentially uncertain—if the word comes to be used in a different 
sense or becomes archaic and falls out of common knowledge. A good example 
is the phrase “domestic violence,” which appears in Article IV, Section 4 of the 
Constitution. In 1789, the term primarily meant riots and insurrections. Today, 
the phrase primarily refers to spousal abuse. A modern reader must therefore 
engage in some interpretative heavy-lifting to avoid getting the wrong 
linguistic meaning. That is, the interpreter must cast aside the modern 
understanding of “domestic violence” and see it in the archaic riots-and-
insurrections sense of the phrase because that is what the original audience 
would have understood. This phenomenon is sometimes called “linguistic 
drift,” and it usually takes decades or centuries to occur.279 
 
Circuit’s management of claim construction doctrine and has most likely made it worse.” R. 
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the 
Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 123, 146. 
277.  Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 102 
(2005). 
278.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
279.  See EDWARD SAPIR, LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SPEECH 165-66 (1921); 
SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE MEANING (2008). 
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This is not the kind of linguistic evolution that Lemley has in mind. 
Rather, Lemley is arguing that the set of real-world objects that are covered by a 
particular claim expands over time. To see this, consider the leading case that 
Lemley cites as a demonstration of his version of the problem: SuperGuide 
Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.280 
In SuperGuide, the patent related to television programming, and the claim 
recited receiving television programming via “regularly received television 
signals.” In 1985, when the patent was filed, all television signals were analog. 
By 2004, most television signals had changed to digital. The question was 
whether a “regularly received television signal” covered a modern digital signal. 
The court held that it did. According to Lemley, this holding shows that the 
“meaning” of “regularly received television signal” in the claim changed 
between 1985 and 2004.281 
But it is important to see that the linguistic meaning of “regularly received 
television signal” was constant. The linguistic meaning of “regularly received 
television signal” is a television signal that is usually received by users. That 
was its meaning in 1985, and that was its meaning in 2004. What changed was 
the set of real-world objects that fit within the description—they have changed 
from analog signals to digital signals.282 This is not a change in linguistic 
meaning, and it cannot be redressed by better interpretative strategy and tools. 
Consider an analogy. The Constitution allows Congress to regulate 
commerce among the “several States.” The linguistic meaning of “States” has 
not changed between 1789 and 2013; it refers to the semi-autonomous political 
subdivisions that comprise this country. But the set of real-world objects that 
fit within the definition has changed—we have expanded from thirteen States 
to fifty. Nobody thinks that expanding from thirteen States to fifty is a change 
in the meaning of “State,” or that this causes linguistic uncertainty. Likewise, 
nobody should think that the television industry changing from analog signals 
to digital signals represents a change to the linguistic meaning of “regularly 
received television signals,” or that it somehow illustrates linguistic ambiguity 
in claim text. It does not.283 
 
280.  358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
281.  Lemley, supra note 277, at 104. 
282.  See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On 
Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 537 (2008) 
(distinguishing between “thing-scope” and “meaning-scope”). 
283.  The distinction between “linguistic meaning” and “the set of real-world objects that fit 
within the definition” is based on the sense-reference distinction in the philosophy of 
language. The distinction is from Gottlob Frege. Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, 57 
PHIL. REV. 209 (Max Black trans., 1948) (1892). For a discussion in the context of the 
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Yet Lemley is correct in saying that cases like SuperGuide cause uncertainty 
in a more general sense. Judge Michel disagreed with the majority and argued 
for limiting the patentee to analog television signals. Other cases similarly 
support the proposition that a patent claim may only cover the technology that 
was in use at the time of a patent’s filing.284 Patentees and competitors trying 
to ascertain their legal rights have difficulty doing so ahead of time. 
Our point is that this uncertainty does not have linguistic roots. Judge 
Michel argued in SuperGuide: 
I . . . cannot extend the literal scope of the claims to systems for 
receiving signal technology that was not . . . conceived of and reduced 
to practice by these inventors, much less described and enabled in their 
’578 patent application filed in 1985.285 
In other words, Judge Michel argued that a system using digital signals was 
not what the patentee invented. Once again, the disagreement is not what the 
claim language means as a semantic matter, but that the majority and Judge 
Michel had different theories of construction and different policy judgments 
about the desirability of allowing patentees to cover subsequently developed 
technology. 
3.  The Radical Indeterminacy Theory 
The third theory of why claim language would be linguistically unclear is 
not limited to patent law but is more general. It says that all text is inherently 
unclear. This argument was most famously made by Chief Justice Traynor in 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,286 a case that 
appears in virtually every contracts casebook. The same argument receives its 
canonical expression in patent law in Autogiro Co. of America v. United States287: 
Claims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face. A comparison 
must exist. The lucidity of a claim is determined in light of what ideas it 
 
interpretation of legal texts, see Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional 
Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1624-28 
(2009). 
284.  PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
285.  SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 897-98 (Michel, J., concurring in the result). 
286.  442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
287.  384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
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is trying to convey. Only by knowing the idea, can one decide how much 
shadow encumbers the reality. 
. . . . 
        The inability of words to achieve precision is none the less extant 
with patent claims than it is with statutes. The problem is likely more 
acute with claims. . . . An invention exists most importantly as a tangible 
structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an 
afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This 
conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which 
cannot be satisfactorily filled.288 
It is important to clearly state why this argument is wrong. As an initial 
matter, we can agree with the statement that legal texts, including patent 
claims, are rarely “clear and unambiguous on their face.” As we discussed above, 
discerning the linguistic meaning requires evidence, and that evidence can 
come from other parts of the document, such as the specification, as well as 
outside the document from dictionaries and experts. Without looking at the 
specification in Kinetic Concepts, one would not know that the word “wound” 
in that claim in fact meant skin injuries and not injuries generally.289 
But this is not what opinions like Autogiro end up saying or doing. What 
Autogiro is saying is that unless one first knows “the idea” that the claim is 
trying to convey, one cannot know what the claim says.290 In the next breath, it 
equates “the idea” that the claim is supposedly trying to convey with the idea 
that it should be conveying, i.e., the invention. What Autogiro boils down to is 
saying that the claim is always ambiguous until one knows what the invention 
is, and one should therefore look for the invention (in the specification and 
elsewhere) in order to define the claim. This rhetorical jujitsu transforms the 
test into the standard anti-textualist position. 
The bottom line is that the Autogiro formulation is not showing the 
linguistic ambiguity of text. It merely asserts that text is ambiguous and then 
goes looking for the invention instead. It does not realize that these are 
completely distinct things. And the resulting “ambiguities” it finds—such as 
that the text might not cover the real invention—are not linguistic ambiguities. 
They are simply reflections of the fact that the linguistic meaning of the claim 
 
288.  Id. at 396-97 (emphasis added). 
289.  See supra text accompanying notes 198-203. 
290.  This is already backwards, because the claim language is the best evidence of what ideas it is 
trying to convey. To say that one must know the idea before one can understand language is 
tantamount to saying that communication is impossible without mind-reading. But this 
conceptual mistake is less important than the court’s next move. 
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and the patentee’s invention are different things. Properly understood, there is 
no linguistic ambiguity here. The only reason that people conclude otherwise is 
because they conflate the linguistic meaning with the invention. 
vi.  implications 
As we will explain below, we see three major payoffs to bringing the 
interpretation-construction distinction to patent law. First, once we distinguish 
between linguistic uncertainty and legal uncertainty, it becomes clear that 
linguistic uncertainty is not what is causing disputes in patent law, at least in 
the main. In Section VI.A we argue that the implication of this insight is that 
better linguistic tools—which scholars and judges have devoted much effort to 
developing—will not help much to resolve the uncertainty problem. 
Second, as we have argued in previous Parts, the most significant source of 
uncertainty in patent law today is policy disagreement among judges. We think 
the interpretation-construction distinction provides a useful conceptual tool to 
diagnose such policy disagreement as the cause of uncertainty and also a better 
conceptual framework within which to conduct these policy debates. Some 
scholars in the existing literature seem to—at least on some level—appreciate 
the role of policy disagreement in causing uncertainty in claim analysis, and 
accordingly make what are really policy arguments in favor of a particular claim 
construction methodology (generally speaking, an anti-textualist one). Yet the 
dominance of the linguistic indeterminacy thesis means that even these 
scholars express their policy arguments under the guise of solutions to 
linguistic indeterminacy: these scholars almost always argue that courts should 
consider policy because claim language is pervasively “ambiguous.” As we will 
explain in Section VI.B, we think such linguistic indeterminacy arguments are 
both factually unsound and logically unnecessary. At the same time, we 
reemphasize that we do not contend that language is always clear or always 
resolves disputes; in Section VI.C, we explain how language can be under-
determinate and what courts should do in such situations. Our most 
fundamental contribution is not to say how any specific issue should be 
resolved, but to say that the interpretation-construction distinction provides a 
conceptual tool to explain both the capabilities and limitations of language, and 
provides a conceptual framework within which both linguistic and non-
linguistic arguments can be made cleanly. 
Third, by conceptually separating factual questions of linguistic meaning 
from normative questions of legal effect, the interpretation-construction 
distinction provides a conceptual framework to discuss the perennial issue of 
the institutional allocation of claim analysis. This question has recently been 
subject to heightened attention due to the Federal Circuit’s en banc 
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consideration of the issue in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Electronics 
North America Corp.291 In Section VI.D we will explain how the interpretation-
construction distinction provides a better way to frame the issue, and how we 
think the issue should be resolved. 
A.  Linguistic Tools and Claim Interpretation 
Our most important claim in this Article is that, contrary to the linguistic 
indeterminacy thesis, the uncertainty in patent rights is generally not caused by 
ambiguity in claim language. Rather, we believe that the uncertainty problem 
is largely attributable to policy disagreement among judges.292 We are not 
claiming that ambiguity and vagueness never occur or cause disputes, but we 
are saying that they are much rarer than the literature tends to assume. At least 
in the most prominent cases at the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, the 
dispute has not centered on a disagreement over what the linguistic meaning is, 
nor over how to fill in gaps in the linguistic meaning, but over whether the 
linguistic meaning should govern. 
The implication that follows is rather pessimistic. What we have shown is 
that the large body of literature that seeks to develop better linguistic tools for 
interpreting claims has been fundamentally misguided. Contrary to the usual 
rhetoric, the claim analysis debate is not a debate between two camps of judges 
with good faith disagreements about linguistic meaning, but who still share the 
linguistic meaning as a common lodestar. Rather, the claim analysis debate is 
one over methodology—some judges are simply not following the linguistic 
meaning.293 Better linguistic tools, to more accurately discern the linguistic 
meaning, cannot resolve this fundamental methodological disagreement. To 
the extent that scholars and judges have been trying to clarify linguistic 
ambiguities and debating the best linguistic tools for the job (rather than 
fighting a proxy war over policy under the guise of linguistics), those efforts 
have been largely in vain and will continue to be unproductive. 
 
291.  No. 2012-1014 (Fed. Cir. argued Sept. 13, 2013). 
292.  We should note that our fundamental claim—that better linguistic tools will not help—still 
holds even if claims are pervasively vague, even though we do not believe this to be the case. 
Vagueness, unlike ambiguity, cannot be solved by better interpretative tools. 
293.  See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 276, at 147 (finding a “very substantial split in 
methodological approach”). 
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B.  Policy Arguments and Claim Construction 
Lest we be misunderstood, we are not saying that no one in the existing 
literature has appreciated the role of policy arguments in claim analysis 
disputes. In our eyes, numerous scholarly proposals for courts to give greater 
weight to the real invention in claim construction, including most prominently 
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley’s proposal for courts to abolish claims altogether, 
are really about policy and not linguistics.294 That is, we think the best 
argument in favor of such anti-textualism in claim construction is that 
following patentee-written claim text is likely to result in substantively 
overbroad patent monopolies, because patentees are likely to write claims in a 
self-serving manner. Having courts ignore claim text in favor of enforcing a 
neutral judge’s conception of the real invention would likely result in less 
biased (and narrower) patent scope, and this is arguably a better policy 
outcome.295 Not only do we think this is the best argument in favor of the anti-
textualist approach, we think it is the real intuition that underlies anti-
textualist proposals. 
Yet no anti-textualist scholar ever does more than briefly allude to this 
argument.296 The reason for the omission is obvious: the logical conclusion of 
the argument is that patent claims should be ignored even if the text is 
linguistically clear. Arguing that judges should ignore clear text is considered 
taboo in our culture,297 especially because the linguistic indeterminacy thesis is 
so deeply entrenched in patent law (the flip side of saying that all of our 
problems come from unclear text is a reflexive assumption that clear text is 
inherently good). A scholar who made the argument explicitly would damage 
his own credibility. 
For this reason, anti-textualists typically present their argument in a 
linguistic guise: they argue that courts should look for the real invention 
 
294.  See, e.g., Burk, supra note 2; Burk & Lemley, supra note 1; Cotropia, supra note 45; Lee, supra 
note 2; Liivak, supra note 43. 
295.  Though we emphasize that this is contestable. As one of us has explained elsewhere, courts 
are unlikely to have the information to determine the correct scope of a patent. Tun-Jen 
Chiang, Forcing Patentee Claims (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 12-51, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130961. Having courts follow biased 
claims, at least to some extent, may be better than having courts attempt blind stabs at the 
optimal patent scope. 
296.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
297.  As a telling example, Craig Allen Nard labels a claim-centered approach as 
“hypertextualism” and an invention-centered approach (which he strongly favors) as 
“pragmatic textualism.” Nard, supra note 1, at 4-6. He takes pains to portray his preferred 
approach as still “embracing the importance of textual fidelity.” Id. at 6. 
 the yale law journal  123:530   2013  
608 
 
because, when claim language is ambiguous, courts must look beyond the 
text.298 This framing serves as a shield against charges that their proposals 
amount to having courts ignore clear text in favor of judge-imposed policy.299 
In a second step, however, anti-textualists then argue that claims are always 
ambiguous,300 so the final result is that courts should always look for the real 
invention.301 The upshot is that the linguistic framing achieves the same 
substantive result, while giving anti-textualists two rhetorical advantages: 
First, they avoid the taboo of saying that courts should ignore clear text.302 
Second, they avoid having to acknowledge the normative contestability of their 
 
298.  See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 32 (arguing that courts should “constru[e] patent 
claims narrowly and in light of the actual invention when the claim terms are ambiguous”); 
Lee, supra note 2, at 105 (“Where the Phillips methodology does not yield a clear 
interpretation, I suggest that policy considerations aimed at promoting technological 
progress should inform claim construction.”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 40 (“In the cult’s 
view, [claims] are just the exclusive rights granted by a patent. That definition gives very 
few contextual clues as to the distinction between correct and incorrect interpretations.”). 
299.  Lee, supra note 2, at 113 (“[I]t bears emphasizing that under my proposal, substantive and 
policy considerations only come into play when traditional claim construction does not yield 
a clear answer; given the void that some interpretive gloss must fill, the charge of ‘redrafting’ 
claims seems inapposite.”); see also Burk, supra note 2, at 119 (arguing that “[t]he text 
remains central” to his approach and “it is hardly a recipe for judicial activism”); Liivak, 
supra note 43, at 42 (“Claims can and do play a central role in this system.”); Nard, supra 
note 1, at 10 (“This emphasis on textual internal coherence is central to pragmatic textualism 
. . . .”). 
300.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1745 & n.10 (“‘[C]laim construction may be inherently 
indeterminate.’” (quoting Schwartz, supra note 1, at 259)); id. (“‘[T]he nature of language 
makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application.’” (quoting 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002))); Burk & 
Lemley, supra note 37, at 52 (arguing that “the words of claims” are indeterminate); Lee, 
supra note 2, at 102-04, 114 (arguing that claim interpretation is “inherently difficult to 
perform,” “fraught with indeterminacy,” “highly indeterminate,” and has “well-known 
difficulties”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 40-42 (arguing that claim text alone is 
“meaningless”); see also Nard, supra note 1, at 57 (“The hypertextualist philosophy relies too 
heavily on the power of the word to convey meaning with clarity.”). 
301.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1784-85 (suggesting that patent law should abolish claims); 
Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 30 (arguing that because there is “no such thing” as a plain 
meaning to claims, courts should instead “start with the patentee’s invention itself, 
construing patent claims narrowly and in light of the actual invention when the claim terms 
are ambiguous”). 
302.  We are not suggesting that anti-textualists consciously manipulate their argument. The 
taboo against ignoring clear text is internalized into the lawyer psyche to the extent that it 
often requires no conscious awareness. Our point is that, even if unconscious, the anti-
textualist move piggybacks on this political dynamic. 
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policy prescriptions.303 Instead of defending the normative merits of their 
approach, anti-textualists declare in a Borg-like manner that textualism is 
hopeless, anti-textualism is inevitable, and resistance is futile.304 
Although we understand the rhetorical usefulness of this move, we think it 
is problematic for two reasons. First, the approach relies on a logical fallacy, 
namely collapsing the interpretation-construction distinction. The standard 
anti-textualist move requires endorsing the linguistic indeterminacy thesis and 
portraying claim text as pervasively ambiguous, but the “ambiguities” that are 
commonly cited in the literature are not linguistic but legal.305 The result, once 
viewed through the lens of the interpretation-construction distinction, is a 
deep irony: the uncertainty over claim construction arises because judges 
disagree about whether textualism or anti-textualism is the better 
methodology, and anti-textualist scholars are citing this very disagreement as 
“proof” that anti-textualism is not only the better methodology but an 
inevitable one.306 A better example of a self-fulfilling prophecy cannot be 
found. 
Second, the approach dodges the real debate. If—as we think is the case—
the real argument in favor of a look-for-the-real-invention approach is that it 
results in what anti-textualists view as better policy outcomes, then this 
argument should be made explicitly. Such candor is more conceptually sound 
 
303.  Of course, the substantive debates at issue here—textualism versus anti-textualism, broad 
patents versus narrow patents—are debates that have eluded consensus for centuries. We 
understand the desire to avoid the quagmire. Our point is that these are the real debates that 
underlie claim construction disputes. They cannot be avoided. 
304.  See Burk, supra note 2, at 119 (arguing that anti-textualism simply “recognizes the latitude 
judges have, that originalism serves to conceal”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1791 
(stating that the “simple answer” to textualist objections is that textualism in patent law has 
already “failed catastrophically”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 54 (“[W]here 
indeterminacy exists—as it inevitably will—courts will be required to shape the appropriate 
boundary . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
305.  See, e.g., Burk, supra note 2, at 116-17 (citing high reversal rate); Burk & Lemley, supra note 
1, at 1744-45 (citing legal uncertainty over construction of words such as “‘a,’ ‘or,’ ‘to,’ 
‘including,’ and ‘through’”). See also supra Section V.B. 
306.  The anti-textualism-is-inevitable meme has another logical defect, which is that the very act 
of arguing for inevitability provides evidence that the inevitability claim is false. If anti-
textualism were truly inevitable, then there would be no need for anyone to write articles 
arguing for judges to adopt it. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the 
System?, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232153 (calling this the 
inside/outside fallacy); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 
307, 329 (2008) (discussing the inside/outside fallacy as a problem of double standards for 
possibility). In one passage of their article, Burk and Lemley seem to show awareness of this 
problem and frame their argument as a call for transparency, Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 
1783, but their article as a whole cannot be reasonably read as so limited. 
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and makes for more productive scholarship. Right now, textualists are not 
being called upon to normatively defend their reliance on patentee-written 
claim text because anti-textualist scholars do not overtly question it; they 
instead devote most of their energy to arguing the fallacious proposition that 
text cannot be followed because it is indeterminate. Our goal is to redirect the 
debate away from this plainly wrong proposition to what we regard as the 
real—and far more interesting—policy issue. Textualists should explicitly make 
the policy case in favor of textualism (and broader patents); and anti-
textualists should explicitly make the policy case in favor of anti-textualism 
(and narrower patents).307 The interpretation-construction distinction helps 
create a climate for such candor by exposing this policy disagreement as the 
real underlying debate. To the extent that we make the anti-textualist case 
more politically difficult by removing the linguistic varnish from their 
argument (in a political environment where judges are unlikely to accept 
unvarnished anti-textualist arguments), we regard this as an incidental effect. 
We do not think it undermines our claim to neutrality on the substantive 
policy issue. 
C.  The Resolution of Vagueness 
Although we think that the standard anti-textualist argument regarding the 
radical indeterminacy of text—and its follow-up implication that courts not 
only should, but inevitably must, look beyond text—is seriously mistaken, we 
should note that there is a limited set of circumstances where it has validity. 
Specifically, as we explained in Subsection IV.D.1 where a claim is vague and 
the dispute falls within the construction zone, courts indeed must look beyond 
the text. 
The problem here is that anti-textualists over-generalize the extent of this 
phenomenon, by characterizing this as a feature of all claim analysis.308 That is 
not correct. 
The implication of our analysis for the vagueness problem is twofold. In 
situations of genuine vagueness, where disputes fall within the construction 
 
307.  In theory, textualism does not necessarily lead to broader patents, since a court could 
construe the claim as written and then invalidate it. But, given the structural bias against 
invalidity, a textualist approach to claim construction will generally result in broader patent 
scope. See supra note 95. 
308.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1797-98 (“[C]laim constructions are unlikely to help a 
judge or jury understand the patent claim because they take simple English words and 
replace them with more simple English words.”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 40 (arguing that 
current claim analysis is generally a “meaningless exercise”). 
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zone, courts should recognize that claim text cannot itself provide all the 
answers, and thus policy considerations will necessarily come into play. Failure 
to acknowledge this fact won’t make it go away; it will only result in courts 
issuing empty “interpretations” that leave the substantive decision-making to 
black-box juries.309 On the other hand, one should be careful not to overstate 
how frequently disputes are actually caused by vagueness. The most prominent 
examples in the case law (e.g., Phillips and Markman) are not true examples of 
this type of problem.310 The examples provided by anti-textualist scholars also 
generally miss the mark.311 Thus, although we agree with the anti-textualists as 
to the resolution of vagueness when it occurs, we think vagueness is a narrower 
problem than commonly believed. 
D.  The Role of Institutional Allocation 
A final implication of the interpretation-construction distinction is to shed 
much light on the long-standing debate over institutional allocation, namely 
whether claim analysis is a question of law for (appellate) judges or a question 
of fact for juries. Ever since the Supreme Court in Markman held that claim 
analysis should be treated as a “purely legal” issue “under the authority of the 
single appeals court,”312 a cottage industry has arisen to argue that the Federal 
Circuit should nonetheless treat claim analysis as a question of fact and defer to 
trial courts in their findings.313 The Federal Circuit is currently considering this 
issue en banc in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America 
Corp.314 
As an initial matter, let us say that the interpretation-construction 
distinction provides support for the proponents of the argument that claim 
 
309.  See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
310.  As we explained above, even Marine Polymer, which really does involve a vague claim term 
(“biocompatible”), is not an example of this problem, because the dispute did not fall within 
the construction zone. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (opinion of Dyk, J.); see supra text accompanying notes 219-221. 
311.  See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 37 (arguing that “screw” might encompass a nail if 
the real invention encompassed nails). 
312.  Markman III, 517 U.S. at 391. 
313.  See, e.g., ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 665; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 58-61; 
NARD, supra note 17, at 448-51; Anderson & Menell, supra note 48, at 22-23; Eileen M. 
Herlihy, Appellate Review of Patent Claim Construction: Should the Federal Circuit Be Its Own 
Lexicographer in Matters Related to the Seventh Amendment?, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 469, 489, 492-93 (2009); Rai, supra note 49, at 882. 
314.  No. 2012-1014 (Fed. Cir. argued Sept. 13, 2013). 
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analysis is factual in one important respect. Properly understood, claim 
interpretation is a factual question about what people in the art actually 
understand the language to communicate. Markman’s holding that the entirety 
of claim analysis should be treated as a “purely legal” issue creates a legal 
fiction that departs from reality.315 
That said, we disagree with those who argue that the Federal Circuit 
should hold claim analysis to be a question of fact and give deference to district 
courts, which we believe to be the overwhelming consensus of academic 
opinion.316 We disagree for two reasons. 
First, we do not think this course is properly open to the Federal Circuit as 
a subordinate court, given what Markman very clearly held. Those who argue 
for deference to district courts like to point to the passage in Markman where 
the Supreme Court stated: “[T]he sounder course, when available, is to classify 
a mongrel practice (like construing a term of art following receipt of evidence) 
by . . . comparing the modern practice to earlier ones . . . .”317 They argue that 
this shows that the Supreme Court held claim analysis to be a mongrel practice 
with a factual component.318 But this is not a reasonable description of what 
the Court was doing in the quoted passage. The Supreme Court was making 
an observation about the intrinsic nature of the problem—how to classify what 
is intrinsically a mixed practice—before choosing a doctrinal classification. The 
holding is what the Court then does—whether it classifies claim analysis as legal 
or factual for doctrinal purposes. In Markman the Court chose “purely legal.” 
Second, as a normative matter, although we think that claim analysis really 
is a mixed question, as between its two components (interpretation and 
construction) we think that existing disputes are mainly over construction. The 
primary source of dispute is not a factual disagreement over what the language 
means, but over doctrinal methodology: should patent scope be governed by the 
linguistic meaning or by the real invention? Juries and trial judges are not well-
equipped to resolve this question. From the perspective of achieving long-term 
resolution, we think a consensus about the proper methodology for claim 
construction is far more likely to emerge from candid deliberation among 
 
315.  Nard, supra note 1, at 35. 
316.  See supra note 313. 
317.  Markman III, 517 U.S. at 378. 
318.  See, e.g., ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 665; Rai, supra note 49, at 882; see also Anderson 
& Menell, supra note 48, at 25 (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s de novo review standard 
has improperly “diverged from the Supreme Court’s characterization of claim construction 
as a ‘mongrel practice’”); Nard, supra note 1, at 23-24 (observing that “[t]his language 
breathed new life into the pragmatic textualists who . . . argued that de novo review was not 
the sole standard of review”). 
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twelve appellate judges (or nine Supreme Court Justices) than it is to emerge 
among hundreds of district court judges across the nation each following their 
own individually preferred methodologies in the individual cases that come 
before them. Under this system, textualist district court judges will follow the 
linguistic meaning of patentee-drafted claim text while anti-textualist district 
court judges will follow their subjective conception of the real invention. That, 
more than anything else, is likely to perpetuate the uncertainty over patent 
rights.319 
conclusion 
The starting point of all conventional discussion in claim analysis is the 
linguistic indeterminacy thesis: the assumption that the root cause of difficulty 
in analyzing patent claims is linguistic indeterminacy. Our fundamental 
contribution in this Article is to show that the linguistic indeterminacy thesis is 
wrong. The entire claim analysis literature has been taken off-track by this 
fundamental error. Contrary to the belief that ex ante uncertainty arises 
because judges disagree about the content of the linguistic meaning of a claim, 
we have shown that uncertainty arises because judges disagree about whether to 
follow the linguistic meaning as a matter of normative policy. 
In some sense, the claim that judges decide cases according to their policy 
preferences may strike cynical-minded readers as unsurprising. But the 
enormous literature that treats claim analysis as a linguistic question belies any 
contention that our claim is well-known. Moreover, our contribution is not 
merely to make the simple-minded and cynical claim that judges act according 
to their policy preferences; it is more importantly to provide a conceptual tool 
to clearly expose how this occurs. By providing a conceptual tool to explain 
precisely why the linguistic indeterminacy thesis errs and how it clouds the 
existing debate, we provide a better foundation within which future policy 
prescriptions can be made more cleanly and be evaluated on their policy merits, 
rather than forcing the debate to be conducted under a misleading linguistic 
gloss. 
The final take-away is that the uncertainty about claim scope will persist 
until judges reach normative agreement about claim analysis policy (or such 
normative agreement is imposed from above, such as by Congress). We do not 
have any suggestions about how to force life-tenured judges to reach policy 
consensus. But understanding the nature of the problem is a predicate to 
 
319.  See Lefstin, supra note 9, at 1041-42 (arguing that predictability outside of litigation is more 
important than predictability after trial). 
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finding a solution. Without adopting the interpretation-construction 
distinction and overcoming the linguistic indeterminacy fallacy, no progress 
can be made on the claim analysis problem. 
